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      On July 7, 1988, Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North,1 his uniform crisp and 
                                                                
1North’s “spit and polish” image had a positive influence on the public’s perception of 
him.  LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FIREWALL:  THE IRAN-CONTRA CONSPIRACY AND COVER-UP 133 
(1997) (referring to a tidal wave of public support for North). Otto Friedrich, “The Roughest 
Year” Scandal, War, Crash, Plague . . . and Who’s in Charge, TIME MAG., January 4, 1988, at 
32 (referring to the public support for North). A native of San Antonio, Texas, an altar boy, 
and a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, North saw combat in Vietnam, service for which 
he was awarded two Purple Hearts, the Bronze Medal and the Silver Star. Richard Stengel et 
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his medals gleaming, stood ramrod straight before a panel of lawmakers and a bank 
of television cameras.2 Raising his right hand with the sharpness usually reserved for 
a salute,3 he swore to tell the truth. North was testifying before the congressional 
committee4 investigating a matter popularly referred to as the Iran-Contra Affair:  the 
U.S. government’s covert sale of arms to Iran and diversion of the monetary 
proceeds to Nicaraguan rebels known as Contras.5  North, a National Security 
                                                          
al., True Belief Unhampered by Doubt, From Small-town Boy to Shadow Secretary of State, 
Oliver North Did Not Know When to Stop, TIME MAG., July 13, 1987, at 28.   When Marine 
Pvt. Randy Herrod, who had served under North, was accused of participating in the massacre 
of sixteen women and children during a search-and-destroy mission in the Vietnamese village 
Son Thang, North testified in his defense, crediting Herrod with saving his life in battle; 
Herrod was acquitted. Michael D. Sallah & Mitch Weiss, Experts:  Earlier Tiger Force Probe 
Could Have Averted My Lai Carnage, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 19, 2003, at 1, available at 
http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/99999999/SRTIGERFORCE/110190
166. After North’s Congressional testimony, North faced a criminal trial on three charges:  
accepting an illegal gratuity; aiding and abetting in the obstruction of a congressional inquiry; 
and destruction of documents. United States v. North, 920 F.2d  940, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1990). He 
was convicted on all charges, but the convictions were later overturned because of the 
likelihood that North’s widely publicized, immunized testimony before Congress had 
influenced the testimony of witnesses at his criminal trial. Id.  On remand, the independent 
counsel who had prosecuted North moved to dismiss all charges because he believed it was 
impossible to establish that witnesses had not been influenced by North’s congressional 
testimony; the trial court granted the motion. John W. Mashek, Charges on North Dismissed, 
Prosecutor Can’t Meet Requirement, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 17, 1991, at 1.  In 1994, North ran 
unsuccessfully for the U.S. Senate.  Nancy Mathis, Election ’94: Nation/Republicans gain 
Senate control/But Democrat Robb holds off Oliver North in Virginia, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 
9, 1994, at A42.       
2Sally Jacobs, North the Family Man Faces BC Crowds, Pro and Con, BOSTON GLOBE,  
Nov. 3, 1988, at 31.   
3Associated Press, Photo:  Lt. Col. Oliver North shown taking the oath before the Iran-
Contra committee in Washington on July 7, 1987, reprinted in Dawn Ceol, High Court Gives 
North Big Victory, WASHINGTON TIMES, May 29, 1991, at A1; also available at 
http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/images/daily/north_070787ap.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp
-srv/politics/special/clinton/frenzy/iran.htm&h=152&w=200&sz=16&hl=en&start=11&um=1 
&tbnid=VETlLNOlGGp5pM:&tbnh=79&tbnw=104&prev=/images%3Fq%3Doliver%2Bnort
h%2Bap%26svnum%3D10%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26rls%3DTSHA,TSHA:2005-52,T 
SHA:en. 
4The Senate and the House each had a committee investigating the matter, so the title of 
the proceeding is Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. on 
Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the H. Select Comm. to 
Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 100th Cong. pt. I (1987) [hereinafter 
Hearings Iran] (testimony of Oliver L. North).  
5United States v. North, 698 F. Supp. 322, 324 (D.D.C. 1998) (recounting North’s 
statements that the money raised by the sale of missiles to Iran was used to support the 
contras); United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (vacating some of North’s 
convictions and reversing other); Abraham D. Sofaer, Iran-Contra:  Ethical Conduct and 
Public Policy, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1081, 1084 ( 2003) (“The first sale of arms to Iran during the 
Reagan Administration took place on August 20, 1985 . . . .”).    
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Council aide in the administration of President Ronald Reagan,6 was accused of 
coordinating this secret government operation.7   
Democratic Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii, who had sat on the Senate 
committee investigating the Watergate scandal fourteen years earlier,8 presided over 
the hearing.9  Representing North was Washington, D.C., lawyer Brendan Sullivan, 
Jr.,10 who proved to be an aggressive advocate, raising a number of objections as 
North was questioned.11  Inouye, as Chair, consistently overruled Sullivan’s 
objections with little comment.12  Eventually, however, Inouye appeared to tire of 
Sullivan’s zeal. When Counsel to the Committee asked North about documents he 
had shredded,13 Sullivan objected.14  Instead of ruling on the objection, Inouye 
moved to silence Sullivan with this mandate:  “Let the witness object if he wishes 
to.”15  That instruction prompted Sullivan’s famous retort:  “I am not a potted plant. 
I’m here as a lawyer.  That’s my job.”16  Inouye did not respond to Sullivan’s “potted 
                                                                
6Hasenfus v. Secord, 962 F.2d 1556, 1558 (11th Cir. 1992).        
7Id.    
8Miami Herald Staff, A Guide to the Investigation, MIAMI HERALD, May 3, 1987, at 28A  ;   
Tom Farmer, Guardians of Liberty; Battle for 442nd Went Beyond War—Heroes Faced 
Racism at Home, BOSTON HERALD at M 20.  Like North, Inouye was a combat veteran.  He 
received the highest award given by the U.S. military, the Medal of Honor, for his valor in 
attacking a ridge during a World War II battle; he was struck by a grenade, resulting in 
amputation of his right arm; although these severe injuries would ordinarily result in 
evacuation, Inouye refused to leave until those in his command were safely behind the lines. 
9See generally Hearings Iran, supra note 4.      
10Miriam Rozen, Edward Bennett Williams, Because He Reasserted—Within the Context 
of a Prestigious 1980s Law Firm—The Age-old Notion that Lawyers Can and Should be 
Advocates for Even the Most Unpopular Clients and Causes, 11 AM. LAW. 123 (March, 1989). 
Sullivan had also served in the military, as a Captain in the United States Army.  Id.  
11For example, Sullivan objected to the fact that Counsel to the Committee, during his 
questioning, was reading from a transcript North had not seen; Inouye overruled the objection.  
Hearings Iran, supra note 4, at 8. Sullivan later objected that a question asked by Committee 
Counsel assumed facts not in evidence; Inouye overruled the objection. Id. at 17. Sullivan also 
objected that North was being asked a question he had already answered; Inouye overruled 
Sullivan’s objection. Id. at 20. Subsequently, Sullivan objected because Counsel to the 
Committee was being asked a question based on someone else’s notes; Inouye ruled, “For the 
purpose of a congressional inquiry, the question is proper. Objection is overruled.” Id. at 24.   
12See generally Hearings Iran, supra note 4. 
13Id. at 262 (North acknowledging he shredded documents in his position with the 
National Security Council).   
14Id.   
15Id. at 263.   
16Id.    
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss2/5
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plant” argument.17  Instead, Inouye ignored the objection and directed Counsel for 
the Committee to continue questioning the witness.18   
Inouye’s notion that the responsibility for making objections should rest with the 
witness instead of his lawyer did not arise from any failure to understand courtroom 
rules and procedure.  Inouye graduated from George Washington School of Law.19 
He was admitted to the bar in Hawaii,20 where he served as a prosecutor for two 
years.21 Instead, the dispute as to Sullivan’s role resulted from a fundamental 
disagreement between the two men regarding the nature of a congressional hearing. 
A career litigator,22 Sullivan saw the proceeding as a type of trial. While he had little 
choice but to agree with Inouye that the hearing room was not a court of law23 
governed by the rules of evidence,24—it clearly was not—Sullivan’s objections were 
plainly evidentiary in nature.25  Sullivan objected, for example, that one question 
assumed facts that had not been established,26 that another question had already been 
asked and answered,27 and that a third was an improper effort to impeach North with 
a document he did not author.28 Inouye’s effort to silence Sullivan, on the other hand, 
arose from Inouye’s view of the hearing: that it was his prerogative, as Chair, to 
conduct the proceeding in whatever manner he chose.29  The starkest statement of 
Inouye’s perspective was his response to one of Sullivan’s objections:  “We will 
proceed in the fashion we wish to.”30  Neither man could cite to a set of rules that 
                                                                
17Id.     
18Id.      
19John Jae-Nam Han, Daniel K. Inouye (1942-   ), in ASIAN AMERICAN AUTOBIOGRAPHERS:  
A BIO-BIBLIOGRAPHICAL CRITICAL SOURCEBOOK  142-43 (Guiyou Huang ed., 2001).   
20Id.   
21Id.     
22WALSH, supra note 1, at 164.  
23Sullivan agreed with Inouye that the hearing room was not a courtroom and that the rules 
of evidence did not apply, but he insisted that fairness was required in the hearing, and that 
what he sought to accomplish with his objections was fairness.  Hearings Iran, supra note 4, 
at 262-63.    
24Id.   
25See supra note 11.  
26Hearings Iran, supra note 4, at 17; cf. United States v. Smith, 354 F.3d 390, 396 n.5 (5th 
Cir. 2003) (ruling that question assuming facts not in evidence was improper) (quoting 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §7 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 5th ed. 1999)). 
27Hearings Iran, supra note 4, at 20; cf. United States v. Blackwell, 459 F.3d 739, 756 
(6th Cir. 2006) (holding that trial court’s sustaining of objection that question had already 
been asked was a “correct legal application of standard, justifiable rules of evidence”).    
28Hearings Iran, supra note 4, at 24; cf.  FED. R. EVID. 801 & 802 (defining and generally 
prohibiting hearsay).   
29See Hearings Iran, supra note 4, at 134.   
30Id. 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008
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supported his position, because there essentially were no rules.31  Inouye attempted 
to create a rule that the witness in a congressional hearing must raise any objections, 
while his lawyer sits silent.  Inouye could make that effort because there was, after 
all, no rule allowing attorney objections.  Sullivan could object when he thought it 
appropriate because there was no rule prohibiting attorney objections.  In the void 
created by the absence of standards, Sullivan and Inouye struggled, each trying to 
create the rules that suited his purpose by conducting himself as if those rules were 
already in place. 
At three points in the hearing, Inouye and Sullivan spoke somewhat openly about 
their opposing perspectives and their battle to define the rules of the proceeding. 
First, during an early skirmish about documents, Sullivan said, “I don’t come up here 
to the Congress. My life is spent a few blocks away in the courthouse where we as 
defense lawyers focus on individual rights.”32 Second, in response to one of 
Sullivan’s objections,33 Inouye asserted his prerogative as Chair to preside in 
whatever way he chose, in his words, to “proceed in the fashion we wish to.”34   
Third, immediately before the “potted plant”35 exchange, Sullivan invoked the one 
limit on Inouye’s power that the senator would be hard-pressed to deny, particularly 
in a televised hearing:  “Come on, let’s have, Mr. Chairman, plain fairness. Plain 
fairness, that’s all we’re asking for.”36  Inouye responded, “I’m certain counsel 
realizes this is not a court of law.”37  Sullivan’s reply was heavy with irony:  
“Believe me, I know that.”38 Inouye continued, “I’m certain you realize the rules of 
                                                                
31Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, regarding committee procedure, makes 
reference to a committee’s authority to subpoena documents and witnesses, along with the 
requirement that each witness provide the committee with a written version of his testimony a 
day in advance of giving it. The rule makes no reference to any attorney or lawyer for the 
witness, or any objections to be raised on behalf of the witness, or any rules regarding hearsay, 
e.g., or of evidence the probative value of which is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice. See United States Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Standing 
Rules of the Senate (2000), Rule XXVI Committee Procedure, available at 
http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/rule26.php.  The House of Representatives does not appear 
to have any standing rules that relate to witnesses at hearings, lawyers, objections, hearsay, 
prejudice, or any related topic. See Home Page of House of Representatives Committee on 
Rules, http://www.rules.house.gov. Almost a century ago, the House of Representatives did 
prohibit leading questions in the impeachment trial of Judge Robert W. Archbald. Canon’s 
Precedents, Volume VI, Chapter CXCIX, Rules of Evidence in an Impeachment Trial, § 493, 
available at http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/rules/cannon/cannon_cxcix.pdf.  The President 
Pro Tempore of the House also ruled, in the Archbald impeachment trial, that character 
witnesses could testify as to the judge’s judicial integrity, but not as to his industry.  Id. at § 
495.  The President Pro Tempore also ruled that character witnesses could not testify based 
exclusively on their opinions.  Id.     
32Hearings Iran, supra note 4, at 4.   
33Id. at 20.    
34Id. at 134.   
35Id. at 263.   
36Id.   
37Id.   
38Id.   
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evidence do not apply in this inquiry.”39  Sullivan responded, “That I know as well. 
I’m just asking for fairness.”40  Although Inouye affirmed his commitment to 
“fairness,”41 that concept was of little use in the hearing.  It was so vague that it 
encompassed both Inouye’s instruction that Sullivan could not object42 and 
Sullivan’s insistence that it was his job to object.43    
The dispute also revealed each man’s view of the Senate as an institution. Inouye 
saw the hearing simply as a tool of the legislative body to which he had belonged for 
so many years.44 He treated the testimony of witnesses as one of several implements 
he and his colleagues had at their disposal to carry out their work as legislators—
work which they conducted as they saw fit, regardless of the tool they used.45 In 
questioning a witness, Inouye did not consider himself bound by the rules of 
evidence,46 any more than he would consider himself bound by those rules when he 
argued on the floor of the Senate. Sullivan’s focus was instead on his client. He had 
no concern for the Senate as an institution; his one intention was to make sure that 
North was as protected as he would be in a court of law.47     
The compelling lesson of the hearing is this:  Inouye and Sullivan were correct 
when they agreed48 that no evidentiary rules governed the hearing; except in cases of 
impeachment, there are scarcely any truth-promoting rules applicable to 
congressional hearings. This void is particularly significant in light of the deference 
that courts often afford to Congress’s findings49—courts whose own fact-finding 
process, by contrast, is governed by specific, detailed rules intended “to secure 
fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and 
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth 
may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.”50  The disparity between the 
rules of courts and the rules of Congress gives rise to this question: is the rigor—or 
                                                                
39Id.   
40Id.   
41Id. at 262-65.    
42Id. at 263.   
43Id.   
44Dorothy Collin, Watergate Veteran Inouye Chosen to Lead Senate Iran Probe, CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE, December 17, 1986, at News Section 1 (Inouye had served in Senate 24 years at 
time of Iran-Contra hearings).   
45United States Senate, Committee on Rules and Administration, Standing Rules of the 
Senate, Rule XXV Standing Committees, (2000), available at  http://rules.senate.gov/senate 
rules/rule25.php (general provisions regarding committees).   
46See supra notes 31 and 11 and accompanying text.  
47See supra note 11.     
48Hearings Iran, supra note 4, at 263.   
49See infra text accompanying notes 342-49.   
50FED. R. EVID. 102.  The Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1975, during 
Inouye’s tenure in the Senate.  Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 stat. 1926, 
1926 (1975).   
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lack of it—with which Congress evaluates the reliability of evidence an appropriate 
factor for courts to consider in deciding whether to defer to a congressional finding?      
In this Article, I consider whether Congress should adopt rules to fill the void in 
which Inouye and Sullivan struggled for control. In Part I, I give a brief summary of 
the development and use of Congressional Committees. In Part II, I analyze several 
modern-day congressional hearings in an effort to examine the degree to which 
Congress and its committees require that the evidence on which they base their 
findings be reliable. I focus primarily, though not exclusively, on the modern-day 
impeachment trials and other high-profile proceedings such as the Clarence Thomas 
confirmation hearings. The usefulness of these more famous—sometimes 
infamous—proceedings arises from the fact that they place legislators and their 
evidentiary rulings in the limelight of public attention, thus heightening the visibility 
of Congress’s decisions to value trustworthiness or to sacrifice it to partisanship. I 
suggest that political considerations have infected fact-finding to an increasing 
extent, to the point that almost all fact-finding in modern hearings is deliberately 
shaped so as to accomplish a political goal. In Part III, I employ the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart,51 along with the legislative 
findings which were significant to that decision, as a lens through which to view the 
relationship between the reliability of Congress’s evidence and the propriety of 
judicial deference to the findings based on that evidence. In Part IV, I narrow the 
focus to examine the Court’s rationale for the decision in Gonzales v. Carhart,52 and 
I suggest that the rationale offered in the decision does not fully explain the ruling 
and that the subtext must be taken into account in order for the decision to be 
understood. In Part V, I recommend that Congress either employ neutral fact-finding 
bodies or adopt rules of evidence to promote reliability in its hearings, and I suggest 
that deference to legislative findings should depend on the presence of such limits to 
check unbridled discretion in fact-finding.   
I.  CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND THEIR HEARINGS AS TOOLS USED IN THE 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
A.  The Early Development of the Congressional Committee 
Since its earliest days, Congress has conducted much of its work through 
committees, each responsible for a specific area of concern.53 There are two basic 
types of committees within each house of Congress: (1) select committees, which 
exist as long as necessary to complete the work on a particular issue;54 and (2) the 
                                                                
51Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).  
52Id.  
53See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.    
54United States Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Standing Rules of the 
Senate, Rule XXVI Committee Procedure § 2, (2000), available at  
http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/rule26.php (providing that, unless otherwise specified,  the 
phrase “each committee,” as used in the Standing Rules of the Senate, includes standing, as 
well as select committees, also known as special committees).  Some select committees are 
sufficiently permanent in nature that the Standing Rules of the Senate include provisions 
expressly specific to those committees.  See, e.g. Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule XXXIV 
Public Financial Disclosure; Rule XXXV Gifts; Rule XXXVII Conflict of Interest (Senate 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss2/5
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standing committees specified in Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate. In 
its early years, Congress had no standing committees—only select committees. 
During the First Congress, for example, the Senate appointed select committees to 
address such diverse issues as: protecting the nation’s trade ships from Barbary 
pirates in the Mediterranean;55 ensuring that the United States paid its debts to certain 
foreign officers, in spite of the difficulty posed by the poor bookkeeping of the 
officers’ Paris banker;56 and resolving questions as to the boundary between the 
United States and Canada.57 The committee taking up the matter of repaying the 
foreign officers received testimony from two witnesses: one of the earliest, perhaps 
the earliest, occasion on which a committee of Congress considered the testimony of 
witnesses.58  Like the Senate, the House of Representatives appointed select 
committees in the First Congress to address such matters as: providing land as a 
bounty for Virginia officers and soldiers;59 monitoring commerce between the United 
States and Great Britain;60 determining whether Congress should make a loan to a 
glassmaker in dire financial straits;61 identifying the boundaries of New York, 
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania;62 and resolving four election disputes.63   
It was also during the First Congress that the Senate had occasion to exercise its 
constitutional64 prerogative in deciding whether to ratify a treaty. President 
Washington had entered into an agreement referred to in the ratification hearings as 
“A Treaty Recently Made with the Cherokee Indians . . . .”65 In a practice that would 
become a defining characteristic of the congressional process, the question of 
                                                          
Select Committee on Ethics); and Rule XXVII Committee Staff (Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence).  United States Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Standing Rules 
of the Senate, (2000), available at http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/.  
55REP. OF A COMM. ON THE TRADE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN, S. FOREIGN RELATIONS DOC. 
NO. 1-45, at 108 (3d Sess. 1791). 
56SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BILL AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PAY DEBTS DUE TO 
FOREIGN OFFICERS, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, Library of Congress, Senate, 1st Congress, 3rd 
Session, Finance, Volume 1, at 27, February 22, 1791.   
57EASTERN BOUNDARY, REP. OF A COMM., S. FOREIGN RELATIONS DOC. NO. 1-42, at 100 
(2d Sess. 1790).  
58See supra note 56.   
59VIRGINIA MILITARY BOUNTY LANDS, H.R. DOC. NO. 1-1, at 5 (1st Sess. 1789).  
60REP. OF A COMM. ON THE SUBJECT OF OUR COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH GREAT 
BRITAIN, H.R. FOREIGN RELATIONS DOC. NO. 1-52, at 128 (3d Sess. 1791).  
61LOAN TO JOHN F. AMELUNG, H.R. FINANCE DOC. NO. 1-14, at 61 (2d Sess. 1790).  
62CESSIONS FROM NEW YORK AND MASSACHUSETTS, H.R. DOC. NO. 1-2, at 7 (1st Sess. 
1789).  
63ILLEGALITY OF THE ELECTIONS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES FROM NEW JERSEY, H.R. 
MISCELLANEOUS DOC. NO. 1-9, at 9 (1st Sess. 1789).    
64U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.     
65THE CHEROKEES, S. DOC. NO. 2-1, at 135 (1st Sess. 1791); see also THE CHEROKEES, S. 
DOC. NO. 1-13, at 33 (2d Sess. 1790) (setting forth President Washington’s communication to 
the Senate regarding a treaty with the Cherokees).   
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008
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ratifying the treaty—a decision ultimately the responsibility of the Senate—was 
considered first by a committee, in this case the Senate Select Committee on 
Presidents [sic] Transmitting a Treaty Recently Made with the Cherokee Indians.66 
Although the committee expressed concern that the treaty included stipulations 
similar to those “gratuitously promised to the Creeks; and although, [the committee 
found that the provisions] form[ed] an excess to the sum limited in [an earlier 
Congressional resolution regarding the terms to be included in the treaty, the 
committee determined that], . . . from the beneficial effects likely to be produced 
thereby, [the treaty could not] . . . be objectionable.”67  The committee therefore 
recommended ratification,68 and the Senate followed that recommendation.69 
Even though Congress initially employed only select, rather than standing, 
committees,70 the need for more continuity soon became apparent. Some of the select 
committees, such as the House Committee of Elections71 and the Senate Committee 
of Elections,72 were called into service repeatedly, presaging the formation of the 
more permanent, standing committees. In 1816, the Senate appointed its first 
standing committees, which were the Committees on: Claims; Commerce and 
Manufactures; Finance; Foreign Relations; the Judiciary; Military Affairs; the 
Militia; Naval Affairs; Post Offices and Post Roads; and Public Lands.73 The House 
appointed its first standing committee, Ways and Means, during the Fourth 
Congress.74  As of 2007, the Senate has seventeen standing committees,75 while the 
House of Representatives has twenty.76  
B. Congress’s Authority with Regard to Committees  
Although the Constitution does not expressly confer on Congress the authority to 
conduct hearings, the existence of that power, and the broad limits within which it 
may be exercised, are now beyond dispute.77 Congress’s power to investigate arises 
                                                                
66Id.  
67Id. 
68Id. 
69Id.   
70See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.     
71See supra note 63.  
72CONTESTED ELECTION OF ALBERT GALLATIN, A SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA, S. 
MISCELLANEOUS DOC. No. 2-42, at 73 (1st Sess. 1794).  
73United States Senate, Senate Committees, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/ 
common/briefing/Committees.htm. (last visited Oct. 23, 2007).  
74Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/ 
house_history/committee_firsts.html. (last visited Oct. 23, 2007). 
75United States Senate, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/committees/d_three_sections_ 
with_teasers/committees_home.htm. (last visited Oct. 23, 2007). 
76United States House of Representatives, http://www.house.gov/house/CommitteeWWW. 
shtml. (last visited Oct. 23, 2007). 
77Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 193 n.21 (1957) (citing 4. Cong. Deb. 889).  
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from its power to legislate. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that this 
power is “deeply rooted in American and English institutions . . . .”78 Without that 
authority, Congress would be hampered to such an extent that it could not be 
expected to carry out its work.79   
Congress’s power to conduct hearings extends even to fact-finding that is not 
related to specific, pending matters to be decided by a vote. In the early- to mid-
nineteenth century, Congress began to use a particular type of congressional hearing, 
known as the investigative hearing, to inquire into matters that warranted the 
attention of Congress. These hearings were not intended to result in a specific 
legislative action, such as ratification of a treaty, passage of legislation, confirmation 
of a presidential appointee, or impeachment of an official. Instead, their purpose was 
to determine the facts—to learn what happened in a particular transaction or event so 
Congress or one of its constituent bodies could take action, including legislative 
action, if necessary. Among the earliest congressional investigative hearings were 
two proceedings, each related to the Civil War—one investigating an economic 
measure that arguably contributed to that conflict and the other investigating a 
deadly uprising against slavery. In 1827, the Committee on Manufacturers of the 
House of Representatives conducted a hearing into the effect a revision in tariff laws 
would have on domestic manufacturers.80 Although the hearing related to legislation, 
it was investigative in character because the potential consequences for 
manufacturers caused a sense of urgency that required a prompt and thorough 
inquiry.  The tariff in fact became law and was viewed, particularly in the South, as 
harmful, to such an extent that it was referred to as the “Tariff of Abominations.”81 
Thirty-two years later, in 1859, a Senate committee employed the same tool used in 
the House—the congressional hearing—in its investigation of John Brown’s raid at 
Harper’s Ferry.82  As was the case with the House Committee on Manufacturers, the 
hearing was investigative in nature because it involved significant fact-finding—
                                                                
78Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 160 (1955). 
79Watkins, 354 U.S. at 194-95. 
80Id. at 193 n.21.  
81WALTER A. MCDOUGALL, FREEDOM JUST AROUND THE CORNER:  A NEW AMERICAN 
HISTORY, 1585-1828 494 (2004).    
82Watkins, 354 U.S. at 193 n.22 (citing Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1859)).  
John Brown was vehemently opposed to slavery.  See generally BENJAMIN QUARLES, ALLIES 
FOR FREEDOM: BLACKS AND JOHN BROWN (1974).  On the night of October 16, 1859, he led a 
party in a raid on Harper’s Ferry, Virginia.  Id. at 90-91.  He and his men captured the federal 
arsenal there, planning to use the weapons obtained from that arsenal to arm slaves for a 
rebellion. Id. at 93. Brown was quickly captured by a force led by Robert E. Lee, who would 
later lead the Army of Northern Virginia during the Civil War. Id. at 51. Brown was convicted 
of treason, and was hanged on December 2, 1859. Id. at 109-11, 120.  After the Civil War 
broke out two years after his death, the Union Army used a marching song that began with the 
lyric, ‘John Brown’s body lies a-mouldering in the grave.’ Id. at 4. Abolitionist Frederick 
Douglas, upon meeting Brown for the first time in 1848, said of Brown: “[t]hough a white 
gentleman, [he] is in sympathy a black man, and is as deeply interested in our cause, as though 
his own soul had been pierced with the iron of slavery. . . .”  LOUIS A. DECARO, JR., FIRE 
FROM THE MIDST OF YOU: A RELIGIOUS LIFE OF JOHN BROWN 41 (2002) (alterations in 
original).   
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determining what happened.  The character of the hearing as investigative did not 
alter the fact that legislation might result from it. In fact, the committee’s purpose in 
the hearing was to obtain information necessary to recommend any legislation the 
committee found to be necessary to protect public property and preserve the peace.83 
Another type of hearing within Congress’s power is the legislative hearing, 
conducted in order to determine whether legislation should be enacted and what 
should be its provisions. Congress’s authority to base legislation on such hearings is 
a prominent feature of a Prohibition-era court decision. Congress became concerned 
that an exception allowing the prescription of alcohol for medicinal purposes might 
actually be used to obtain alcohol for use as a beverage, thus circumventing the law. 
To reduce the possibility of such abuses, Congress adopted the Volstead Act,84 and 
the Willis-Campbell Act,85 which prohibited any doctor from prescribing to any one 
person within a ten-day period more than the amount of alcohol set by those 
statutes.86  A physician challenged the statute, seeking a restraining order prohibiting 
the authorities from interfering with his prescription of “vinous or spirituous liquors” 
to patients in excess of the limits allowed by the statutes.87  Using arguments with 
some parallels to those raised by physicians in Gonzales v. Carhart,88 the suit 
challenging the Partial Birth Abortion Prohibition Act of 2003,89 the physician 
asserted that he had the right and duty to treat his patients’ diseases and “promote 
their physical well-being according to the untrammeled exercise of his best skill and 
scientifically trained judgment, and . . . to advise the use of such medicines . . . as in 
his opinion are best calculated to effect their cure and establish their health.”90  He 
further asserted that the use of liquor as medicine in greater amounts than the statutes 
allow “is, in certain cases, necessary for the proper treatment of patients in order to 
afford relief from known ailments.”91 In upholding the statutes, the court referred to 
the hearings conducted when Congress considered the adoption of the statutes 
limiting the amount physicians could prescribe. In enacting the statues, Congress 
relied on the following information presented in committee hearings:  (1) the fact 
that alcohol had never been recognized as a medicine in the authoritative publication 
on medicines; (2) that 104 leading scientists and physicians signed a statement that 
such beverages “serve no medical purpose which cannot be satisfactorily met in 
other ways, and that without the danger of cultivating the beverage use of an 
                                                                
83Watkins, 354 U.S. at 193 n.22 (citing Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1859)).   
84Volstead Act, 66 Cong. Ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919). 
85Willis-Campbell Act, 67 Cong. Ch. 134, 42 Stat. 222 (1921) 
86Lambert v. Yellowley, 4 F.2d 915, 917 (2d Cir. 1924).   
87See generally id.  
88Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 481-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), 
reversed by but cited for some propositions in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1637-38 
(2007).   
89See infra test at notes 343-56 and accompanying text.  
90Lambert, 4 F.2d at 916.   
91Id. 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss2/5
2008] DOES CONGRESS FIND FACTS OR CONSTRUCT THEM? 331 
alcoholic liquor”;92 (3) that several thousand physicians signed a document with 
essentially the same content; and (4) that only one physician testified that beer was a 
medicine.93  The specificity of the findings influenced the court in upholding the 
law.94 
While Congress’s power to conduct hearings is broad, it is not without limits. 
The United States Supreme Court gave some definition to the extent of that power in 
a case arising from hearings before the United States House of Representatives 
Committee on Un-American Activities.  The purported purpose of that committee 
was to root out Communism in the nation.  The case before the Supreme Court 
involved the conviction of a witness for contempt of Congress as a result of his 
refusal to answer questions before the Committee.95  The Court held that Congress 
possesses the broad power, inherent in the legislative process, to conduct hearings.96 
This power of Congress does not relate exclusively to existing laws, but also to 
statutes that are proposed or, if not proposed, just possibly needed. Despite the reach 
of Congress’s power, the Court held that neither Congress nor its committees have 
the power to pry into a person’s private affairs when the inquiry: (1) is not related to 
the functions of Congress; (2) is conducted exclusively for the aggrandizement of a 
legislator; 97 or (3) is used to punish the person being investigated.98 Because the 
Committee transgressed those limits in questioning the witness, the Court held that a 
judgment in favor of the witness on his contempt conviction should be entered. The 
Court affirmed the existence of other limits on the power to conduct hearings when it 
affirmed that the Bill of Rights applies to congressional hearings.99  Alluding to, but 
not declaring, other potential limits on a governmental body’s power to conduct 
hearings, the Court described the evolution of the hearing power from British law.100 
Hearings to gather and evaluate facts to be used by the British Parliament are 
conducted, not by Parliament or any of its constituent bodies, but by Royal 
Commissions of Inquiry.101 Such Commissions are “comprised of experts in the 
problem to be studied . . . [and] removed from the turbulent forces of politics and 
partisan considerations.”102  The juxtaposition of these two types of fact-finders—
self-aggrandizing legislators in the McCarthy hearings and non-partisan experts 
relied on by the British Parliament—demonstrates the Court’s concern that 
politicians engaged in fact-finding may be engaged less in a search for truth and 
more in a quest for political gain. 
                                                                
92Id. at 921 n.2.   
93Id.  
94Id. at 923.   
95Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 186 (1957). 
96Id. at 187.   
97Id. at 187.   
98Id. 
99Id. at 188. 
100Id.   
101Id. at 191-92.   
102Id. at 192.  
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In spite of the differences in the two types of proceedings, congressional hearings 
do share some features with court hearings:  Congress and its committees, like the 
courts of the United States, are governed by the Bill of Rights;103 they have the 
power to compel the attendance of a witness by use of a subpoena,104 and receive 
testimony from witnesses subject to penalty of perjury;105 finally, both have the 
power to punish contempt.106  Overshadowing these similarities between court 
hearings and congressional hearings is a stark difference between the two:  the 
absence of evidentiary rules in congressional hearings. Nothing in the Constitution, 
or in any statute, regulation, or court decision requires Congress or its committees to 
conduct their hearings according to the Federal Rules of Evidence or any other set of 
evidentiary rules.107 As a result of this dearth of evidentiary standards, some 
congressional hearings may be seen as operating on the whim, caprice, and the 
personal agenda of the legislators involved. Even worse, the absence of meaningful 
evidentiary rules leaves open the possibility that the hearings could, in fact, be 
influenced by such improper factors. 
C.  A Hearing in the Aftermath of the Lincoln Assassination as an Early Indication, 
in a High-Profile Matter, of Congress’s Concern with the Reliability of Evidence  
A hearing giving some indications of Congress’s attitude toward reliability 
occurred in the mid-nineteenth century, roughly a year after the assassination of 
President Abraham Lincoln.  Congress directed the Judiciary Committee to conduct 
an inquiry into “the nature of the evidence implicating Jefferson Davis”,108 inter alia, 
                                                                
103Bennett v. Kline, 486 F. Supp. 36, 39 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (stating that the First Amendment 
“restrains Congress”); Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (firing 
improper when based on tenured professor’s invocation of Fifth Amendment rights at 
congressional hearing).   
1042 U.S.C. § 195a (2000).  
105Hoston v. Silbert, 681 F.2d 876, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“[S]uborning perjury to 
congressional committees . . . .”).    
106United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 699 (1993) (citing prior cases as authority that 
Congress can punish contempt, but noting that the cases do not support the argument that a 
court can punish a contempt which Congress has already punished).     
107The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment do apply to Congressional hearings, because the Bill of Rights 
governs. Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 123 n.8 (1963) (explaining that a witness is 
entitled to explanation of a question’s pertinence, if a timely request is made).   
108H.R. REP. NO. 39-104, at 1 (1st Sess. 1866). After the assassination of Abraham 
Lincoln, Andrew Johnson, who succeeded Lincoln as President and was widely viewed as 
being too lenient toward the South during Reconstruction, accused Davis of complicity in the 
crime, called for his arrest, and offered a reward of $100,000 in gold. WILLIAM J. COOPER, 
JEFFERSON DAVIS, AMERICAN 533 ( 2000). Davis was taken into custody. Some reports say he 
was wearing a woman’s dress and shawl at the time of capture in an effort to prevent detection 
and held in a military prison for two years, until the charges against him were transferred to a 
civilian court, making bail possible. The group that provided that bail included wealthy 
industrialist Cornelius Vanderbilt, newspaper editor Horace Greeley, and abolitionist Gerrit 
Smith, the last of them having come to sympathize with Davis after receiving a letter from 
Davis’s wife Varina.  Id. at 561, 566.  Although the initial charges against Davis at the time of 
his capture were for complicity in the Lincoln assassination, those allegations could not be 
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in Lincoln’s assassination.  One of the evidentiary questions raised by this hearing 
relates to proof of other crimes and bad acts. The committee was able to 
demonstrate, through Davis’s own words,109 that in retaliation for the Emancipation 
Proclamation, Davis ordered that every white officer leading emancipated slaves 
against the Confederacy be put to death if captured, unless the court found other 
punishment more appropriate.110 The committee referred not only to this order, but to 
other offenses committed by Davis: his treason in prosecuting the Civil War and 
leading the government of the rebelling states;111 his criminal acts in ordering the 
destruction of northern cities and the infliction of injury and death on the people of 
the North;112 and his participation in the mistreatment and starvation of Union 
soldiers held in Confederate prisons.113 The committee had evidence of these 
misdeeds, often in Davis’s own words, appearing in documents found in a 
Confederate archive.114    
Whether these bad acts were relevant to the committee’s work is an example of 
an evidence question that now115 arises with some frequency: were Davis’s prior 
crimes in prosecuting the war material evidence as to whether he was complicit in 
the Lincoln assassination? The general rule, as every self-respecting second-year law 
student knows, is that evidence of other crimes or wrongs should not be considered, 
because considering it involves the risk that the accused will be convicted because of 
his previous crimes, for which he is not on trial.116 That general rule appears to 
require that the evidence of Davis’s prior crimes not be allowed, in a forum where 
this general rule is to be followed. The rule, however, does not control the 
admissibility of evidence of Davis’s previous crimes. The countervailing principle, 
which in fact is dispositive on questions of this nature, is expressed in the 
committee’s reference to Jefferson’s prior wrongs:     
But the declarations made and the acts done in pursuance of these 
declarations are conclusive proofs of the brutal and malignant feelings by 
                                                          
sustained on the available evidence, so the charge eventually brought against Davis was 
treason. The government ultimately decided not to pursue the treason charge.  Id. at 572.     
109The committee did not address the authenticity of these documents, other than to state 
that they came from “rebel archives.” H.R. REP. NO. 39-104, at 1.  
110Id. at 3.  
111Id.     
112Id. at 2.    
113Id. at 3-4.     
114Id. at 1, 3.   
115The Federal Rules of Evidence did not exist at the time of this hearing, and so the 
committee members cannot be expected to have applied them, nor can the committee members 
be criticized for now applying them.  To the extent, however, that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence embody principles of fairness and reliability, they are a useful tool with which to 
examine evidentiary decisions, to determine whether the decisions are in accord with those 
principles of fairness and reliability.  Moreover, the Federal Rules of Evidence incorporate 
much of the common law of evidence as it existed at the time of their adoption in 1975.   
116See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 & n.5 (1991) (discussing the admissibility 
of evidence of prior bad acts).   
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which the leaders of the rebellion were controlled, and rendered it not 
only possible but probable that they would at once engage in projects for 
the assassination of the chief man of the republic.117   
Prior bad acts are excluded only when they are offered to prove a person’s 
character. Nothing in the record of the committee’s proceedings involves the 
assertion that Davis’s prior bad acts prove he was a bad man who was likely to 
assassinate Lincoln. Instead, the committee’s use of this evidence is an example of 
the rule that prior bad acts are inadmissible only when offered to prove propensity, 
and that they are not admissible when offered for any other purpose, such as proving 
motive.118 The reason Davis mandated the execution of certain Union officers, 
ordered that northern cities be burned, and encouraged the starvation of Union 
soldiers in Confederate prisons is that he hated the Union and sought to destroy it 
through violence. Those same sentiments, according to the committee, would 
motivate him to participate in an effort to assassinate Lincoln. While the evidence 
might be objectionable on some other ground, it is not impermissible character 
evidence, because it was offered to prove motive, rather than character.          
The other significant section119 of the hearing transcript describes more direct 
evidence bearing on the question of Davis’s role in any assassination plot. This 
section of the record consists of letters, which are quoted in the text of the 
committee’s report and delivered to the Senate.120 Having concluded that Davis’s 
other crimes were probative of his motive, the committee turned to these letters in an 
effort to determine whether Davis and his government may have had any connection 
with potential assassins. The letters, if authentic, established that men offering to 
serve as assassins contacted Davis and other Confederate officials, and that the 
officials sometimes made notations on letters from these men about what should be 
done with, or in response to, the letters.121  A potential assassin named H.C. Durham, 
of Savannah, Georgia, wrote a very pointed letter on August 17, 1863, but that letter 
is not compelling evidence of Davis’s guilt. Not only does the letter predate the 
assassination by almost two years, but the plan Durham describes differs drastically 
from the events of April 14, 1865. What Durham recommended to Davis was more a 
military force than a conspiracy—not surprising, given that the recommendation was 
made as the Civil War raged. Dunham suggested that he enter the United States with 
three hundred to five hundred men to assassinate Seward, Lincoln, and others.122 The 
committee reported that the following notations were written by Col. J.C. Ives on 
Dunham’s letter after Davis received it:   “Asks permission to take from three to five 
hundred men and assassinate the leading men in the United States.  Respectfully 
referred, by direction of the president, to the honorable secretary of war.  August 24, 
                                                                
117H.R. REP. NO. 39-104, at 3.   
118See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(allowing proof of prior bad acts in proving motive).     
119See generally H.R. REP. NO. 39-104.  
120Id. 
121See infra notes 126-129 and accompanying text. 
122H.R. REP. NO. 39-104, at 23.  
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File.”123 The report does not indicate that further action was taken with regard to the 
Dunham letter.     
J.S. Parramore also wrote to Davis, offering to “dispose of the leading characters 
of the north . . . .”124 Describing the notations on this piece of correspondence, the 
committee stated, “At the top of this letter, in the handwriting of Jefferson Davis, is 
the following note, ‘Secretary of war. J.D.’ Upon the back of this letter is this 
indorsement [sic], under the name and residence of the writer:  ‘Has discovered 
mode of disposing of the leading characters at north. File.’”125   
Are the letters authentic? The committee provided no information on this point, 
other than emphasizing that documents used in the investigation were obtained from 
“rebel archives.”126 The probative value of the documents which inculpated Davis 
depends on whether the committee determined that the letters were what they 
purported to be. Not only would the letters themselves have to be authenticated, but 
also the notations purporting to have been made on them by Davis and by others. 
While the technology available to falsify or modify documents has improved since 
1866, forgeries and alterations, even if done by hand, could be accomplished at that 
time. The question of whether the words attributed to Davis were in fact written by 
him could have resolved by calling a witness familiar with his handwriting, or by 
comparing the entry to a known sample of his writing. The committee did not 
disclose its basis for identifying the handwriting as Davis’s. The broader question of 
the authenticity of all the documents requires information about the “rebel 
archive,”127 referred to as the source of these documents, but the record of the 
committee’s work includes no explanation regarding who obtained that archive, 
when, from whom, and who had custody of it at the time of the hearing;128 nor is 
there information about who recognized Davis’s handwriting and how.129 The 
committee appears to have assumed the authenticity and identification of all 
documents.     
When the most fundamental evidentiary principles—that evidence should be 
relevant and documents should be real—are applied to the committee’s report, what 
remains is proof of Davis’s motive and little more. The committee’s conclusions, 
although full of equivocations, still went further than the evidence warranted. The 
committee found: 
The evidence in possession of the committee connecting Jefferson Davis 
with the assassination of President Lincoln justifies the committee in 
saying that there is probable cause to believe that he was privy to the 
measures which led to the commission of the deed; but the investigations 
which have been made by the War Department and by the committee have 
                                                                
123Id.   
124Id. at 22.   
125Id. at 23.   
126Id. at 1.   
127Id.   
128See generally  H.R. REP. NO. 39-104.   
129Id. 
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not resulted in placing the government in possession of all the facts in the 
case. It is probable, however, that the further prosecution of the 
investigation by the committee and by the officers of the government will 
result in a full development of the whole transaction.130  
The committee also concluded that it was the duty of the executive branch to 
bring any apparent wrongdoer to justice so his guilt or innocence could be 
determined.131  An evaluation of the committee’s work, based on basic principles of 
evidence, leads to this conclusion:  without applying any express evidentiary rules in 
this hearing, the committee considered evidence of motive in a way that comports 
with fundamental evidence law but failed to determine (or at least failed to 
demonstrate in its report that it had determined) the authenticity of documents. 
II.  MODERN CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS AS INDICATORS OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH 
CONGRESS VALUES RELIABILITY 
A.  Evidence Rulings in the Age of Televised Hearings 
Congressional hearings are one of the processes that result in legislative fact-
finding.  Another route through which Congress can accomplish fact-finding is 
simply to make such a finding based on its own judgment, without reviewing 
evidence.132  This latter process, which does not involve evidence, runs a greater risk 
that a court reviewing the statute may be less willing to defer to the finding.133 A 
review of legislative hearings, with special focus on the degree to which Congress 
and its committees are concerned with the trustworthiness of evidence in those 
hearings, provides information pertinent to two questions:  first, the extent to which 
courts faced with the question of deference should consider the rigor with which 
Congress insisted on trustworthy evidence; and second, the need, if any, for 
Congress to adopt basic rules of evidence to govern its own hearings.   
Throughout the nation’s history, Congress and its committees have gathered and 
evaluated evidence as part of their policy-making process. Gathering and evaluating 
evidence necessarily involves judgments as to which evidence will be considered in 
making a decision, and which will not. Television, including the broadcasts available 
on the internet, has changed Congress from a body noticeable primarily because of 
its results, to a mass media phenomenon, especially when Congress conducts 
hearings on matters in which the public is keenly interested.134 While the activities of 
                                                                
130Id. at 1.   
131Id. at 29.   
132See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).   
133Id.   
134Associated Press, CNN Gains from Whitewater Coverage \ Ratings Have Jumped by 29 
Percent for Network. Expert Says Those Watching Proceedings are Either Political Junkies or 
Those Who Want a Distilled Version of Case, AKRON BEACON J., Aug. 6, 1994, at A4 
(reporting that when Cable News Network broadcasted the congressional inquiry into 
President Clinton’s involvement in a land transaction known as Whitewater, the network’s 
ratings jumped twenty-nine percent, but still did not reach the viewership of the Clarence 
Thomas confirmation hearing or the Iran-Contra hearings).    
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Congress are routinely broadcast by comparatively spare, low-rated C-SPAN135 
television networks, high-profile hearings are carried by larger networks and can 
command huge television audiences.136 In these widely-televised hearings, legislators 
seem to face the challenge to accomplish two competing goals: appearing fair; and 
satisfying the desires of their constituents—not just geographical but also 
philosophical constituents—for a resounding victory. Such widely-followed 
hearings, along with other hearings on topics of great public interest, such as 
impeachments and national disasters, highlight the evidentiary decisions by which 
Congress displays its insistence on trustworthy evidence and therefore reveal 
whether legislators are concerned with the trustworthiness of the evidence they 
consider.   
Any evaluation of the evidentiary rulings made in Congress must begin with the 
acknowledgement that no evidentiary rules govern congressional hearings. It is 
unfair to criticize Congress for failing to abide by the Federal Rules of Evidence 
when it is undisputed that neither those rules nor any other set of evidentiary rules 
apply to Congress, its two houses, or the committees of those houses. To the extent 
that the Federal Rules of Evidence and other such codes incorporate a concern with 
trustworthiness and fairness, however, those fundamental principles, as reflected in 
evidence codes, can be used as a yardstick by which to measure Congress’s concern 
with such values. Such an evaluation, using hearings which were televised or bore on 
a matter of great public interest, follows.      
B.  The Rules of Congress Say Little About Evidence 
An analysis of congressional hearings begins with those rules that do apply. The 
Constitution provides that each house of Congress is to “determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings.”137 Pursuant to that language, each body has in fact adopted rules for 
conducting its legislative work on a day-to-day basis.  Proceedings in the Senate are 
governed by the Standing Rules of the Senate, the most recent general revision to 
which occurred in 1979.138  These Senate rules are largely parliamentary in nature; 
they relate to such matters as the order in which the Senate takes up its business,139 
the procedure for voting,140 and the referral of matters to Senate committees.141 Just 
as the Senate is governed by the Standing Rules of the Senate, the House of 
                                                                
135
“C-SPAN” is an acronym for “Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network.”  Cable: 
National Cable & Telecommunications Association, http://www.ncta.com/OrganizationType/ 
CableNetwork/1426.aspx (last visited March 11, 2008).  C-SPAN 1 broadcasts proceedings in 
the House of Representatives. C-SPAN.org, http://www.c-span.org/watch/cspan1.asp (last 
visited March 11, 2008).  C-SPAN 2 broadcasts proceedings in the Senate.  C-SPAN.org, 
http://www.c-span.org/watch/cspan2.asp (last visited March 11, 2008).    
136See Associated Press, supra note 134.  
137U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.   
138United States Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Standing Rules of the 
Senate (2007), available at http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/. 
139Id. at Rules VII and VIII.    
140Id. at Rule XII.   
141Id. at Rule XVII.   
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Representatives is governed by the General House Rules Manual,142 which addresses 
not the quality of evidence the House and its committees will consider, but instead 
such questions as the organization and procedures of committees,143 the order and 
priority of the work of the House,144 and the process for voting.145   
Congress’s business, however, is not exclusively parliamentary, so these rules do 
not suffice for all purposes.  Each body of Congress conducts hearings in which it 
receives evidence, in order to discern the facts related to a matter. Among the 
proceedings in which this fact-finding work may be necessary are impeachment 
trials,146 confirmation hearings,147 oversight and investigative hearings,148 and 
legislative hearings.149  The General House Rules Manual and the Standing Rules of 
the Senate say little about such evidentiary proceedings. As a result, both houses of 
Congress may use additional rules, beyond the usual parliamentary procedures, to 
govern the availability, admission, and use of evidence. These special rules for 
taking evidence may be standing rules, such as the Senate Impeachment Rules, or 
they may comprise uncodified, precedent-setting decisions that the body has 
previously made regarding questions of evidence, such as those found in the House 
Precedents.150 In addition, some of the committees that conducted the hearings 
described below had their own rules, but those rules rarely include any provisions 
related to evidentiary standards.151 
                                                                
142H.R. DOC. NO. 108-241 (2005), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/hrm/browse_ 
109.html.   
143See generally id. at 424-592 (Rules X and XI). Also included in the Manual are rulings, 
covering a period of more than 200 years, made by the officers presiding over the business of 
the house; these precedents have been compiled by the House Parliamentarians.  See GPO 
Access, House Rules and Manual: About (Sept. 20, 2004), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ 
hrm/about.html. 
144Id. at 641 (Rule XIV).   
145Id. at 795 (Rule XX).   
146See infra Part II.C.  
147See infra Part II.D.  
148See infra Part II.D.   
149There is not always a bright line separating the various types of hearings. For example, 
a proceeding that begins as an investigative hearing may become the basis for a proposed law, 
intended to remedy the problems that prompted the investigation. In such as case, the 
investigative hearing becomes a legislative hearing.  
150See, e.g., 3 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
OF THE UNITED STATES 738-57 (1907) (proceedings in the impeachment of Justice Samuel 
Chase).  Rule 19(c)(1) provides that the rules of the House of Representatives Committee on 
Standards of Official Conduct provide that in a proceeding to investigate the conduct of a 
Member of Congress, all relevant evidence is admissible unless privileged.  H.R. COMM. ON 
STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 110TH CONG., RULES OF THE COMM. ON STANDARDS OF 
OFFICIAL CONDUCT, Rule 19(c)(1) (Adopted Feb. 16, 2007), available at 
http://www.house.gov/ethics/Rules_110th.html#_Toc36375680. 
151See, e.g., Staff of Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicararaguan Opposition, 100th Cong., Rules of Procedure (Comm. Print 1987).   
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C.  What Impeachment Trials in the Senate Reveal about Legislators’ Emphasis on 
Reliable Evidence  
Among the most dramatic congressional fact-finding hearings are those through 
which the Senate decides whether to remove from federal office a person who has 
been impeached by the House of Representatives. The roles of the constituent bodies 
of Congress in an impeachment are established in the Constitution, which vests in 
the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment 
proceedings,152 and vests in the Senate the exclusive power to try impeachments.153  
Because the Rules of the Senate offer no guidance regarding impeachment, the 
Senate has adopted standing rules for impeachment trials.154 Those rules cover some 
aspects of the proceeding in great detail.  For example, the rules mandate, verbatim,  
the words the Senate Sergeant at Arms must speak to open the trial;155 they set the 
precise hour at which the impeachment proceedings in the Senate are to commence 
after presentation of the Articles of Impeachment;156 they specify that the Chief 
Justice of the United States is to preside at the impeachment trial of any President, 
Vice-President, or person on whom “the powers and duties of the office of President 
shall have devolved,” 157 and they provide that the Senate may order that an 
impeachment be tried before a committee of the Senate, rather than the Senate as a 
whole.158 
The Senate Impeachment Rules also include references to the admission and 
exclusion of evidence.  The Rules specify that the Presiding Officer of the Senate 
may rule on all evidence issues, “including, but not limited to, questions of 
relevancy, materiality, and redundancy of evidence.”159 The decisions of the 
Presiding Officer, however, are not necessarily final. The Rules provide that any 
senator may call for a vote by the Senate to resolve any evidentiary question in an 
                                                                
152U.S. CONST. art. I, §.2, cl. 5.; I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 (1983) (invalidating 
statute allowing one house of Congress to negate the executive branch’s decision to allow a 
deportable alien to remain in the United States; and listing the only circumstances in which the 
unreviewable action of one house of Congress has the force of law: the House in initiating 
impeachment; the Senate in trying impeachment; the Senate in approving or disapproving 
presidential appointments; and the Senate in ratifying, or not, treaties negotiated by the 
President).     
153U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 6.; I.N.S., 462 U.S. at 955. 
154S. REP. NO. 99-401, at 1 (1986).  Each body receives evidence during its part of an 
impeachment, but the work of the Senate is a better example of congressional fact-finding, 
because the Senate is actually conducting a trial.  Id. (summarizing the Senate’s procedures in 
impeachment trials). 
155
 Id. at 11 (‘All persons are commanded to keep silence, on pain of imprisonment while 
the House of Representatives is exhibiting to the Senate of the United States articles of 
impeachment . . . .’).   
156Id. (“[A]t 1 o’clock the afternoon of the day (Sunday excepted) following [the House 
managers’] presentation . . . [unless] otherwise ordered by the Senate . . . .).   
157Id. at 12.   
158Id. at 13.   
159Id. at 12.   
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impeachment trial.  Such a vote is taken without debate and is governed not by the 
Senate Impeachment Rules, but by the Standing Rules of the Senate.160 Although the 
Senate Impeachment Rules specify that these votes on evidence may be used to 
resolve such questions as relevancy, materiality, and redundancy, the Senate 
Impeachment Rules do not define relevancy, materiality, or redundancy, nor do they 
refer to any precedent or other authority from which those definitions may be 
derived.  In fact, the Senate Impeachment Rules do not mandate that irrelevant, 
immaterial, or redundant evidence be excluded. Instead, they specify who is to make 
those decisions:  ultimately, the Senate itself. Other provisions of the Rules specify 
that objections or requests by the parties or their counsel are to be addressed to the 
Presiding Officer.161 The Rules also allow direct- and cross-examination of 
witnesses,162 as well as opening statements and closing arguments.163 
Since the middle of the twentieth century, four impeachment trials have been 
conducted by the Senates: those of United States District Judge Harry Eugene 
Claiborne; United States District Judge Alcee Lamar Hastings; United States District 
Judge Walter Louis Nixon; and President William Jefferson Clinton. The records of 
these four most recent impeachment trials reveal that, while the Senate’s 
Constitutional responsibility is to “try”164 impeachments, a modern Senate 
impeachment trial bears little resemblance to a court trial,165 because court trials are 
governed primarily by rules while impeachment trials are governed primarily by the 
broad, Constitutionally-conferred power of the Senate to conduct such trials and 
render a verdict. 
1.  Reliability in the First Impeachment Trial Hearing in More Than Half a Century:  
The Claiborne Impeachment 
The 1986 Senate impeachment trial of United States District Judge Harry L. 
Claiborne was the first in more than fifty years.  Unlike the judges impeached after 
him, Claiborne was not limited to presenting his case before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.  After the witnesses appeared before that committee, Claiborne and the 
House Managers were allowed to argue their cases to the Senate as a whole. In fact, 
Claiborne was allowed to address the Senate himself.166  When the issue first arose as 
                                                                
160Id.   
161Id. at 14.   
162Id.    
163Id. at 15.  
164U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole power to try all 
Impeachments.”).     
165The Senate, of course, is under no obligation to conduct an impeachment trial the way a 
court conducts a jury trial.  Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-33 (1993) (finding the 
political question doctrine renders nonjusticiable the propriety of Senate’s decision to try U.S. 
District Judge by committee).      
166See Senate, After Slow Start, Sits as Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1986, at A14 (“[U]p to 80 
senators ultimately listen[ed] to the testimony of Judge Claiborne in his own behalf.”); see 
also Associated Press, Judge’s Trial Goes to Floor, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 6, 1986, 
at 9A (stating that Claiborne may be allowed to address the Senate). 
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to whether the full Senate would hear testimony, Robert Dole, then President Pro 
Tempore of the Senate, made clear that the Senate might hear a summary from 
Claiborne, but would not hear witnesses.167 Explaining this decision, Dole said, “We 
want to protect his rights, but not in a way that will take all week . . . .”168  After the 
summary and the arguments of counsel for both sides, the Senate would vote to 
remove Claiborne from office.   
After the committee had concluded its hearing, when the day arrived for 
presentations to the full Senate, Claiborne and his lawyers were present, as were 
“nine members of the House Judiciary Committee” (who had the responsibility to 
present the case against Claiborne).169  Fifty-one senators were necessary for a 
quorum, but at the hour the full-Senate segment of the trial was set to begin, only ten 
senators were present.170  Before the day was out, there were enough senators to 
constitute a quorum, and Claiborne’s trial proceeded.171  Ultimately, the Senate 
removed Claiborne from office, convicting him on three of four articles of 
impeachment.172 
2.  Reliability in an Impeachment in Which Senators Vote Without Being Present 
When the Evidence Is Received:  The Case of Walter Nixon 
In 1989, the Senate tried the impeachments of two federal district judges—
Walter Nixon and Alcee Hastings.  Each judge was removed from office, and each 
attempted, unsuccessfully, to challenge his removal in court on the basis that his 
impeachment trial should have been conducted by the Senate as a whole, rather than 
a Committee of the Senate.173   
Walter Nixon was convicted in federal district court of two counts of perjury, and 
those convictions were affirmed on appeal.174 The House of Representatives 
subsequently handed down Articles of Impeachment against Nixon, charging that he 
committed perjury and made false statements to federal investigators, all with regard 
                                                                
167Judge’s Trial Goes to Floor, supra note 166.      
168Id.  
169Senate, After Slow Start, Sits as Jury, supra note 166.  The title of the article refers to 
the senators as “jurors,” the term that drew an objection during the Clinton impeachment trial.  
See infra notes 208-15 and accompanying text.  
170Senate, After Slow Start, Sits as Jury, supra note 166. A retired couple from Florida had 
ridden the train all night to be in the Senate Visitors Gallery for the historic trial. The husband 
asked, “Where are all the senators? Are they having parties in their office or are they really 
busy?” He added, “We belong to the Elks Club, and when people don’t show up it’s hard on 
everyone.” Id.    
171Id. 
172Senate Convicts Claiborne, Removes Him from Bench, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 
10, 1986, at 1A.     
173Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 227-29 (1993); Hastings v. United States, 837 F. 
Supp. 3, 4 (D.D.C. 1993). 
174United States v. Nixon, 816 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026 
(1988).   
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to whether he asked a state prosecutor to give favorable treatment to the son of 
Nixon’s business partner.175   
Nixon’s attorneys approached the impeachment trial largely as they would any 
other trial; the attorneys for the House of Representatives and the Senate 
Impeachment Trial Committee trying the impeachment followed the lead of the 
Nixon legal team to some extent, treating the matter for the most part like a court 
trial.  For example, the opposing lawyers engaged in discovery disputes.176 
The attorneys representing Nixon employed a common trial tool when they 
submitted a motion in limine 177 urging the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee to 
exclude: (1) evidence of Nixon’s business dealings with the father of the defendant 
in whose state drug case Nixon was alleged to have intervened; and (2) all transcripts 
in his criminal trial, the grand jury, and related proceedings, except when used to 
impeach a witness’s credibility in the impeachment trial.178  In support of the second 
part of this motion, Nixon argued, in keeping with settled evidence law, that the 
former testimony of any witness is inadmissible to prove the truth of what that 
testimony asserts, unless the witness is unavailable to testify at trial.179  Nixon cited 
Rule 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which requires unavailability, inter alia, 
as a prerequisite for the admission of former testimony as substantive evidence.   
The Senate Impeachment Trial Committee addressed Nixon’s objection to former 
testimony when it met to discuss procedures in preparation for the Committee trial.180 
During this meeting, Senator Howell Heflin of Alabama advised the Committee 
regarding evidence law.  Heflin was both a member of the Senate Impeachment Trial 
Committee for the Walter Nixon impeachment trial, and a member of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, the body responsible for reports and recommendations to the 
full Senate regarding proposed changes in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Heflin’s 
reputation as an expert on evidence was further enhanced by the seven years he 
served as Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court181 before his election to the 
Senate.  Heflin’s status as a former Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, and 
the significance of that service to his work in the Senate, is emphasized in the title of 
his biography, A Judge in Senate. In advising his colleagues regarding the 
admissibility of the record of Nixon’s criminal trial, Heflin indicated that, under the 
                                                                
175See generally S. DOC. NO. 101-17 (1989). 
176See generally Rep. of the S. Impeachment Trial Committee on the Articles against 
Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr.: Hearings Before the S. Impeachment Trial Comm. 101st Cong. pt. 
1 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings Nixon] 
177
“In limine” is a Latin phrase meaning “at the threshold,” as a metaphor for the 
presentation of such a motion as the parties and judge enter the courthouse.  Tennant v. 
MarionHealthCare Found., Inc., 459 S.E.2d 374, 389 (W. Va. 1995); Hartford Accident & 
Indem. Co. v. Samuel Gross & Sons, Inc., No. CIV. A. 92-2567, 1993 WL 117580 (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 31, 1993).   
178Hearings Nixon, supra note 176, at 83-84.  
179Id. at 213.   
180Hearings Nixon, supra note 176, at 21.     
181JOHN HAYMAN WITH CLARA RUTH HAYMAN, A JUDGE IN SENATE: HOWELL HEFLIN’S 
CAREER OF POLITICS AND PRINCIPLE (2001).     
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rules of evidence, matters discussed in the presence of the defendant would be 
admissible when the defendant had the opportunity to respond.182 It appears to have 
been Senator Heflin’s position that the entire record of Nixon’s three-week183 
criminal trial was admissible in the Committee trial as an admission by silence, i.e., 
Heflin advised his colleagues that Nixon had adopted as his own statement 
everything said at his criminal trial by anyone—whether witness, prosecutor, or 
presiding judge—because Nixon was present and could have objected to anything 
with which he disagreed.184 Senator Heflin’s concept of an entire trial as an adoption 
by silence is puzzling. Nixon did dispute statements adverse to him which were 
made during his criminal trial. That is the reason he entered a plea of not guilty and 
sat at the defense table with his lawyers, fighting the criminal charges.      
The Committee followed Heflin’s advice and admitted the testimony, but cited a 
different theory from Heflin’s.  The Committee concluded, “The prior testimony has 
been the subject of adverse cross-examination, and its use will not prejudice any 
party.”185  By basing its ruling on the status of the disputed statements as prior 
testimony, the Committee avoided the significant problems with Heflin’s theory of 
admission by silence while creating other, lesser, problems. When it referred to 
Nixon’s opportunity to cross-examine the prior testimony, the Committee established 
the existence of one, but not all, of the conditions required to admit prior testimony 
as an exception to the hearsay rule.186  The additional requirement imposed by the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, but omitted by the Committee, was that the prior 
testimony be admitted only if the declarant is unavailable to testify.187 While neither 
the Senate nor the Committee was obligated to conduct the trial in accordance with 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, they chose to use those rules in addressing prior 
testimony; yet they deviated from those rules without explanation.  In its other 
significant evidentiary rulings, the Committee denied the House Managers’ motion 
to exclude evidence that Nixon was the victim of prosecutorial misconduct and 
denied Nixon’s motion to exclude evidence of his oil investments with the father of 
the criminal defendant he had been accused of assisting.188 
The Committee did not rely exclusively on the transcripts of prior proceedings. 
Witnesses testified in person before the Committee.189 Direct- and cross-examination 
were conducted somewhat as they would be in a courtroom.190 The Committee 
                                                                
182Hearings Nixon, supra note 176, at 21. 
183Associated Press, Defense Rests Case in Trial of U.S. Judge in Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 8, 1986, at A17.        
184Hearings Nixon, supra note 176, at 21; see, e.g., United States v. Ward, 377 F.3d 671, 
675 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that failure to dispute a statement that money had been obtained 
in bank robbery was adoption of the statement).   
185Hearings Nixon, supra note 176, at 323.  
186FED. R. EVID. 804(b).   
187See generally FED. R. EVID. 804.   
188
 FED. R. EVID. 1101 
189135 CONG. REC. D956-02, 9-7-89. 
190Id.  
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members also questioned the witnesses.191 The Committee did not have the 
responsibility of rendering a verdict or even making a recommendation on the 
question of Nixon’s removal from office.192 That decision was to be made by the 
entire Senate. The Committee’s General Counsel attended a pre-trial meeting of the 
Committee and explained the Committee’s role to its members:   
[T]o receive and report evidence to the Senate . . . . [T]o shape the 
evidentiary proceeding, to rule on questions of evidence, to make 
determinations about relevance, describe the outer boundaries of the 
proceedings, what issues are relevant for the taking of evidence, and then 
to monitor those rules and require adherence to them in a consistent way 
through the proceedings. . . . [T]o submit a summary report . . . of the 
party’s [sic] evidence on contested issues . . . .193   
The Senate did not, however, meet with either party or their lawyers. Neither 
Nixon nor his lawyers were allowed to address the Senate, but the decision was made 
by the Senate—the decision to remove Nixon from office. 
3.  Reliability in an Impeachment Where the Senate Convicts After a Jury Acquits:  
The Hastings Impeachment 
In the impeachment trial of United States District Judge Alcee Hastings, as in 
that of Judge Walter Nixon, witnesses and documents were presented before a Senate 
Impeachment Trial Committee.194  Judge Hastings’s trial, like Judge Nixon’s before 
it, resembled a court trial to some extent, at least during the Committee phase.  The 
Senate trial, however, did not involve any presentation before the Senate by the 
parties.  The role of the Senate was to decide, and their decision was to remove 
Hastings from office.  There was at least one significant difference between the two 
impeachment trials. In Walter Nixon’s trial, the disputes were primarily evidentiary; 
in the Hastings trial, there was one overriding dispute, which related to a question of 
law: whether the Senate could convict Hastings and remove him from office when a 
jury had acquitted him of the charges forming the basis for the Articles of 
Impeachment.  Ruling that it was not bound by the jury verdict, the Senate removed 
Hastings from office.195 A few years after the Senate removed him from the federal 
bench, Judge Hastings was a candidate to represent the Twenty-third Congressional 
District of Florida, a position to which he was elected in 1992 and in which he 
remains as of 2007, having successfully campaigned for re-election seven times.196    
                                                                
191Id.; FED R. EVID. 614 (calling and questioning of witnesses by the court).   
192Hearings Nixon, supra note 176, at pt. 1, 9.  
193Id. at 10-11. 
194Hastings v. United States, 837 F. Supp. 3, 4 (D.D.C. 1993).  
195Id. at 5.     
196Byron York, The Battle of Hastings: Should the Impeached Judge Head the House Intel 
Committee?, NAT’L REV., Dec. 4, 2006.   
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4.  Reliability in an Impeachment in Which the Senate as a Whole Makes the 
Decision, but Does Not Hear Any Witnesses in Person:  The Clinton Impeachment  
The record of the 1999 impeachment trial of President William Jefferson Clinton 
demonstrates that evidentiary rules are not a paramount consideration in a trial that 
will culminate with an unreviewable decision rendered by an elected body. The 
relatively unimportant role of evidentiary rules to the House Managers, the Senate, 
and Clinton is apparent in: (1) the admission of 14,201197 pages of transcripts and 
documents, from legal proceedings having common facts with the impeachment trial, 
without any objection or discussion; (2) the Senate’s unanimous vote to conduct a 
trial in which no witnesses would appear in person to testify before and be 
questioned by the Senate; and (3) the Senate’s emphasis on its own role in the 
proceeding—an emphasis beside which the relevancy, materiality, redundancy, and 
admissibility of evidence may have paled by comparison.   
The Clinton impeachment arose from two legal proceedings to which Clinton 
was a party.  One was a civil action in which he was a defendant—an action he 
ultimately settled after the trial court resolved the matter in his favor on his motion 
for summary judgment.198  Before summary judgment was granted, however, the 
plaintiff gave notice of her intent to call a former intern in the Clinton White House 
as a witness.199  One of the Articles of Impeachment approved by the House of 
Representatives alleged that after learning the former intern was on the plaintiff’s 
witness list, Clinton obstructed justice by persuading the former intern to submit a 
false affidavit in the civil action—persuasion that included the use of Clinton’s 
contacts and connections to obtain for the former intern employment of the type in 
which she was most interested.200   
The other legal proceeding from which the impeachment arose was an 
investigation, by the Office of Independent Counsel, into various allegations against 
Clinton.201  In connection with one part of that investigation, the Independent 
Counsel subpoenaed Clinton to testify before a grand jury.202 The Independent 
Counsel’s investigation was wide-ranging; among the areas of inquiry were 
Clinton’s conduct in the civil action, especially any effort to influence the former 
intern once notice was given that she would be a witness, and the nature of his 
                                                                
197S. DOC. NO. 106-3 (1999), available at www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/sd106-
3.html (figure obtained by totaling the number of pages in each Independent Counsel 
document listed as part of the evidentiary record).    
198Reuters, Clinton Pays Jones $850,000 Settlement The Money Included $475,000 from a 
Company that Provided the President with Personal-Liability Insurance, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
Jan. 13, 1999, at A8.   
199Richard T. Cooper et al., The Starr Report: The Affair, ‘I Never Expected to Fall in 
Love with the President’, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1998, at A1 (Lewinski appeared on Jones’s 
witness in the sexual harassment civil trial on December 5, 1997).  
200KENNETH STARR, INDEPENDENT COUNSEL INVESTIGATION (1998), available at 
http://icreport.access.gpo.gov/report/2toc.htm. 
201Id.  
202Id.   
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relationship with the former intern.203  One of the Articles of Impeachment alleged 
that Clinton committed perjury in his testimony before the grand jury.204 
In trying Clinton, the Senate had both the benefit and the burden of a 14,201-
page record, which included, inter alia, evidence accumulated during the two related 
legal proceedings: the civil action and the investigation by the Office of Independent 
Counsel.  One of the first acts of the Senate in the impeachment trial was a 
unanimous vote205 to admit this vast record en mass, and to provide each senator with 
a copy of these “publicly available materials that have been submitted to or produced 
by the House Judiciary Committee, including . . . any materials printed by the House 
of Representatives or House Judiciary Committee” related to the Clinton 
impeachment.206 Although the Senate Impeachment Rules include procedures for 
resolving such questions as the relevancy, materiality, and redundancy of 
evidence,207 no such questions were raised about any part of this lengthy record—by 
Clinton, the House Managers, or any senator—and so it was admitted in its 
entirety.208  
Although the Senate admitted those 14,201 pages without objection or 
discussion, a single word in the presentation of the House Managers drew an 
objection because it mischaracterized the Senate’s role in the impeachment. In 
setting forth one part of the case against Clinton on behalf of the House of 
Representatives, a House Manager referred to the senators as “jurors,”209 prompting 
Senator Thomas Harkin to make an objection and argue it in detail. He and his 
colleagues were not jurors, Harkin told the Chief Justice, but instead “triers” of the 
impeachment.210 He quoted the Federalist Papers to the effect that, in an 
impeachment trial, “There will be no jury to stand between the judges who are to 
pronounce the sentence of the law and the party who is to receive or suffer it.”211 
Arguing in support of his objection, Harkin rejected the notion that he and his 
colleagues were jurors, in any sense of the word. He drew that sharp distinction by 
enumerating powers which jurors lack and senators have: jurors have no prior 
knowledge of the case, but senators do; jurors cannot overrule the officer presiding 
over the impeachment, but senators can; jurors do not decide what evidence they will 
hear, as senators do; and jurors do not set the standards for admitting and excluding 
evidence, which the Senate does.212 The Chief Justice, sitting as Presiding Officer, 
                                                                
203Id.     
204Id..     
205Trial of Wiliam Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, 145 CONG. REC. 
S1199-S1254 (February 4, 1999). 
206Id.  
207S. REP. NO. 99-401, at 12 (1986).   
208Trial of Wiliam Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, 145 CONG. REC. 
S1199-S1254 (February 4, 1999). 
209145 CONG. REC. S59, 279 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999). 
210Id.    
211Id.    
212Id.   
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agreed with Senator Harkin that the word “jurors” was inaccurate and should not be 
used to refer to senators in an impeachment trial.213 Senator Harkin was correct:  
senators trying an impeachment are not jurors, although they do make determinations 
of fact as necessary. The significance of Senator Harkins’ objection lies less in its 
undisputed validity and more in its status as the first objection, and one of the few 
overall, of any type raised during the Clinton impeachment trial before the Senate.214 
Not only are senators not jurors, but Senate impeachment proceedings resemble a 
court trial in only the most rudimentary sense, i.e., in the sense that both proceedings 
are conducted by an arm of the government, both involve the application of 
standards to facts ascertained in the proceeding, and each, if completed, results in 
some type of decision. Beyond that, there is little similarity. A jury’s work is 
circumscribed by a well-established set of evidentiary rules,215 along with the court 
decisions interpreting those rules, all applied by the presiding judge. By contrast, in 
deciding whether to remove an impeached official, the Senate is bound by no 
authority external to itself to make such determinations as these: which high crimes 
and misdemeanors in addition to treason and bribery constitute impeachable 
offenses; whether the official in fact did what he is accused of doing; whether any 
given item of evidence is relevant, material, or redundant; and what burden of proof 
must be satisfied and who bears it—if in fact any burden of proof actually rests with 
anyone in a Senate impeachment trial. 
While there were no objections to the admission of evidence in the Clinton trial, 
the Senate did make one significant evidentiary decision: whether to call witnesses to 
appear and testify in person before the Senate.216 Although the Managers from the 
House of Representatives sought to have witnesses appear before the Senate,217 the 
unanimous decision of the Senate was that only three witnesses would be called, that 
even those three would appear only through excerpts of video-taped depositions, and 
that each of those depositions would be taken not before the Senate, but before three 
senators assigned to preside at each of the depositions.218 No witness would testify in 
person in the Senate chamber. The motivations for this decision may have had little 
to do with the relevance, materiality, or redundancy of the witnesses’ testimony. 
Instead, the factors influencing senators in this highly visible proceeding likely 
included:  (1) the electorate’s lack of support for removing Clinton from office for 
what the public saw as “private” misconduct;219 (2) the forty-four to fifty-six vote by 
which a motion to dismiss the charges failed—a vote which, though insufficient to 
carry the motion by the required majority vote, demonstrated that there were not 
enough votes to remove Clinton from office;220 and (3) the prospect of testimony in 
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215See generally FED. R. EVID. 
216145 CONG. REC. S991-92 (January 36, 1999) (House Manager McCollum argues for 
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the Senate chamber regarding unseemly details of Clinton’s relationship with the 
intern—a relationship about which the electorate had heard more than enough by the 
time of the impeachment trial.221 
The record of the Clinton trial indicates that even the three depositions which 
were taken in locations remote from the Senate chamber had little significance to the 
Senate’s decision. When the attorney for one of the three witnesses objected that a 
question was repetitive of the witness’s prior testimony already in the Senate record 
as part of the fourteen-thousand-plus documents admitted without discussion, one of 
the senators presiding at the deposition made a telling statement about the trial as a 
whole:   
Well, I appreciate that, but, uh, if this is going to be the case, we don’t 
even need the deposition, because we’re limited to the record and 
everything is in the record. So I think, uh, to be fair, we’re—we’re 
obviously going to have to talk about, uh, some things for 8 [sic] hours 
here, or else we can go home. 222      
The Senate’s readiness to accept documents and unwillingness to hear live 
testimony may have been a consequence of the television cameras that were, by this 
time, commonplace in Congress. The massive documentary record admitted by the 
Senate has essentially no news value and little chance of arousing public interest, so 
the Senate did not mind admitting this evidence, the status of which as documents 
practically guaranteed very little press coverage. These documents were primarily 
from the civil action against Clinton and the investigation by the Office of the 
Independent Counsel. The Senate’s warm welcome of the documentary record stood 
in stark contrast to the cold shoulder given to the idea that witnesses would testify 
about the details of Clinton’s sexual relationship with the intern, in the Senate 
chamber. Therefore, the Senate ruled that no witnesses would testify in the Senate 
chamber, where the senators could observe their demeanor and evaluate their 
credibility. Instead, as discussed above, only three witnesses would appear at all, and 
those by excerpts from the videotape of their depositions taken for the Senate trial. 
The proceeding was less a search for truth—i.e., the facts on which to base a 
decision to remove Clinton from office or not—and more the simple exercise of the 
Senate’s Constitutional power to remove an impeached President from office or not. 
Using that power—individually and corporately—arguably did not require that the 
Senate admit and consider evidence at all, especially after the vote on the motion to 
dismiss revealed what the outcome would be. In fact, nothing in the Constitution, 
except arguably the word “try,” indicates that the Senate must admit or review any 
evidence at all in an impeachment trial.223   
The Senate’s decisions—to devote little time to evidence, and to find Clinton not 
guilty—comported with the desires of the public, as expressed in opinion polls.224 By 
the time of the impeachment trial, the electorate held three opinions strongly. First, 
                                                                
221Associated Press, Polls Remain Solid for Clinton More Than Half Disapproves of 
GOP’s Handling of Case, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 14, 1999 at 19A. 
222145 CONG. REC. S1017, January 27, 1999 (motion to dismiss fails by vote of 56-64). 
223U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; see also I.N.S. v  Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 (1983).   
224Associated Press, supra note 221. 
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the public believed Clinton had testified falsely before the grand jury, but, second, 
they did not want him removed from office for that offense. Finally, and most of all, 
the public wanted the matter to end. In its evidence rulings and its verdict, the Senate 
(a political body whose members are elected) in spite of its lack of attention to 
evidence presented at the impeachment trial, carried out the will of the voters. 
In none of these post-1932 Senate impeachment trials were any witnesses 
questioned before the full Senate. In only one of the trials—the Clinton impeachment 
trial—did the full Senate hear any witness, and then only by excerpts on videotape.    
D.  High Stakes and Low Blows:  The Senate Judiciary Committee’s Hearing on 
Sexual Harassment Charges Against United States Supreme Court Nominee 
Clarence Thomas 
When Judge Clarence Thomas was nominated to the United States Supreme 
Court, the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted a hearing to address allegations 
that Thomas had sexually harassed Anita Hill. A law professor at the time of the 
hearings, Hill had worked for Thomas at two federal agencies.225 The hearing was 
highly contentious and partisan. Some questioning evidenced a lack of concern with 
even minimal standards of reliability, and so the Thomas hearings are indicative of 
the extent to which legislators, when conducting a hearing that will change the 
makeup of the Supreme Court, are concerned with the trustworthiness of evidence.   
Senator Joseph Biden, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, opened that 
body’s hearing on Hill’s sexual harassment charges against Thomas with a statement 
of the ground rules: although witnesses would testify under oath, the hearing was not 
a trial, and it would not end with a formal verdict.226 He also announced that rules of 
courtroom evidence would not apply.227 Senator Biden’s rejection of the rules had an 
entirely different tenor, but the same effect, as Senator Inouye’s similar decision in 
the Iran-Contra hearings.228 Inouye acknowledged he was choosing not to apply the 
rules of evidence, based on his and the Committee’s authority to conduct the 
hearings “as [they] wish[ed] to.”229 Apparently unwilling to assert such an imperial 
prerogative before a large television audience, but also unwilling to be bound by 
evidentiary rules, Biden announced that he was prohibited from using such rules. In 
fact, Biden went so far as to declare that Senate rules not only prohibited the use of 
standard evidentiary rules, but that those Senate rules required the admission of 
evidence that would not be allowed in a courtroom. Biden said, “Thus, evidence and 
questions that would not be permitted in the court of law must, under Senate rules, be 
allowed here.”230 It is not clear to what provision Senator Biden was referring when 
he said the Senate’s rules required that certain questions be allowed during the 
                                                                
225Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. pt. 4, 36-37 
(1991) [hereinafter Hearings Thomas].  
226Id. at 2.  
227Id.  
228Hearings Iran, supra note 4, at 34. 
229Id. at 134. 
230Hearings Thomas, supra note 225, at 2.  
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hearing. Nothing in the Constitution or the Rules of the Senate required, or forbade, 
the use of courtroom evidentiary rules in a Senate confirmation hearing. In contrast 
to Inouye’s bold assertion of power, Biden claimed reliance “on the advice of the 
[unidentified] nonpartisan Senate legal counsel . . . .”231 Biden concluded his 
discussion of evidentiary rules by announcing that he did have, and would exercise, 
the power to declare questions to be out of order if they were not relevant to the 
proceedings, including questions about the “out-of-the-workplace relationships, and 
the intimate lives” of Thomas, Hill, or any other witness.232     
These rulings established at least minimal evidentiary parameters for the hearing: 
the rules of courtroom evidence did not apply, but only relevant evidence would be 
allowed, and evidence of any witness’s out-of-the-workplace intimate life was not 
relevant.  Although Biden’s rulings omitted important issues that were almost certain 
to arise—such as hearsay and the impeachment of witnesses—he did provide 
significantly more information than was available when the Iran-Contra hearings 
began.233   
The first significant evidentiary issue that arose in the hearing in fact related to a 
topic that Biden did not mention in his opening comments:  in questioning Professor 
Anita Hill, Senator Arlen Specter said to her: 
[O]ne of your more recent statements, at least according to a man by the 
name of Carl Stewart, who says that he met you in August of this year. He 
said that he ran into you at the American Bar Association Convention in 
Atlanta, where Professor Hill stated to him in the presence of Stanley 
Grayson, “How great Clarence’s nomination was, and how much he 
deserved it.”234   
Carl Stewart, according to Specter, also reported that Hill, in the same 
conversation at the American Bar Association meeting, went on to discuss Thomas 
and her time working for him when he was Chair of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, and that Hill said nothing about sexual harassment or 
anything else negative about Thomas.235 Specter added that Carl Stewart had 
provided this information and that Stanley Grayson corroborated it.236 Stewart and 
Grayson testified about the incidents much later in the hearing.237 
Specter’s second question, like the first, injected hearsay into the proceedings. He 
referred to a statement from a former dean of Oral Roberts University Law School, 
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232Id. at 3. 
233Hearings Iran, supra note 4. 
234Hearings Thomas, supra note 225, at 58.  
235Id. at 59.   
236Id.  Hill responded to Specter saying that she had said what a good opportunity the 
nomination was for Thomas, not that it was generally a good development.  Id.   
237Hearings Thomas, supra note 225, at 427. Cross-examining the declarant later in the 
hearing does not change the status of the statement as hearsay; the statement at the time it was 
made must be in the hearing and subject to cross-examination.  See FED. R. EVID. 801. 
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where Hill had taught.238 Specter said the former dean had recounted a conversation 
in which Hill had referred to Thomas as “‘a fine man and excellent legal scholar.’”239 
Hill responded that she would not have spoken disparagingly of Thomas to the 
former dean, who admired Thomas a great deal; she further replied that she did not 
recall any comment she made about Thomas’s legal scholarship, especially at that 
time.  Databases of all articles appearing in legal periodicals and texts, which are 
virtually complete, reflect that Thomas did not publish any legal scholarship until 
after Hill left her position at the law school where the conversation with the dean was 
alleged to have occurred.240     
In his third question, Specter again called on Hill to respond to hearsay 
allegations, this time before he even named the declarants. The question was an 
effort to impeach Hill on the issue of whether she knew a woman named Phyllis 
Barry.  Hill had given a newspaper interview in which she was asked to respond to 
statements made by her former co-worker Phyllis Barry.  The newspaper article 
reported that Hill, when confronted with Barry’s statements, responded that she did 
not know a woman named Phyllis Barry, and Phyllis Barry did not know her.241 
Hill’s statement was significant, because she made it in response to Barry’s 
allegation that Hill had fabricated her charges against Thomas because she was 
disappointed Thomas did not show any interest in her sexually.242 Challenging Hill’s 
assertion the she and Barry did not know each other, Specter again relied on hearsay:  
“And there are quite a few people who have come forward to say that they saw you 
and Ms. Barry together and that you knew each other very well.”243 After Hill 
disagreed with the anonymous allegations that Barry knew her well, Specter named 
two of the “quite a few people who . . . [had] come forward” to say Barry did know 
Hill:244  J.C. Alvarez and Anna Jenkins, both of whom testified later in the hearing.245   
When it was his turn to question Hill again, Specter read yet another hearsay 
statement into the record and asked Hill to explain it. Specter again quoted another 
former dean of the law school where Hill had previously taught. According to 
Specter, the former dean had said, regarding Hill’s charges against Thomas, “‘I find 
                                                                
238Hearings Thomas, supra note 225, at 59.  
239Id.  Hill responded, saying that she was influenced by the former dean’s high regard for 
Thomas, and that she did not recall any specific conversations about Thomas in which she 
made reference to his scholarship.  Id.   
240Compare Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63 (1989) 
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Thomas, supra note 225, at 31-33 (providing Anita Hill’s C.V., which reflects that she left her 
position at Oral Roberts University, where the conversation about Thomas’s scholarship is 
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the references to the alleged sexual harassment not only unbelievable but 
preposterous. I am convinced that such are the product of fantasy.’”246 This question, 
based on hearsay, was followed by a lengthy discussion of whether it was 
appropriate for a senator to question Hill about the allegations in the affidavit when 
the witness had not appeared.   
During that discussion regarding the impropriety of using hearsay evidence, 
Senator Leahy raised a concern about calling on Hill to respond to such statements. 
He asked:  
How fair can it be to either Professor Hill or any other witness if any of us 
can sit up here and say, “I have this stack of affidavits, and in affidavit 
No. 5 in the third paragraph somebody says such-and-such. What do you 
have to say about that?”  
I mean, at the very least, at the very least they ought to be able to see 
these affidavits.  At the very least, they ought to have some idea of who 
the person is and if they are credible.247     
Chairman Biden responded: 
It is appropriate to ask Professor Hill anything any Member wishes to ask 
her to plumb the depths of her credibility. It would be appropriate to ask 
her about Mr. Singleton [,whose affidavit the Committee had in its 
possession], but it is inappropriate to represent what Mr. Singleton says 
via an affidavit. There is a distinction.”248   
Biden’s ruling had a rough similarity to elemental principles of fairness embodied in 
the Federal Rules of Evidence:  when he ruled that it was not appropriate to conduct 
a trial by affidavit,249 he acted in keeping with the rule that witnesses should be 
subject to cross-examination; when he concluded that senators could ask questions 
about incidents or topics covered in affidavits without reading or quoting from the 
affidavit, he affirmed the need for broad latitude in the cross-examination of a 
witness.250  
When it was his turn to question Judge Thomas, Senator Howell Heflin began on 
an ominous note:  “Judge Thomas, in addition to Anita Hill, there have surfaced 
some other allegations against you.”251 This statement would ultimately deliver far 
less than it had promised.  As Heflin continued, it became apparent that there he was 
not referring to additional charges that Thomas had committed sexual harassment. 
Referring to the new allegations, Heflin said they had been broadcast “on a television 
show last evening here in Washington, channel 7.”252 Heflin also said it had been 
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reported to him (Heflin) that a congressman named Kluge had said that he (Kluge) in 
the “1980’s, 1983 or something, was a television reporter for a channel here in 
Washington and that he . . . disclosed . . . [allegations that Thomas had not responded 
adequately to a charge, brought by an employee of the agency Thomas directed, that 
another employee of the agency had committed sexual harassment].”253 In asking this 
question, Heflin related compound hearsay. An unidentified person had reported to 
Heflin that Kluge had said, on television the evening before the hearing, that he 
(Kluge) said some years before that Thomas moved too slowly and was too lenient 
with regard to the charges that someone in Thomas’s agency was guilty of sexual 
harassment.254 In making the allegation against Thomas, Heflin used such phrases as, 
“Now, it is reported to me . . . . [and] . . . I hear by hearsay . . . [and] . . . Well, that is 
the way it has been reported to me . . . .”255 Heflin also described efforts he had made 
to obtain documents in order have more information about the matter.256 Senator 
Hatch objected to Heflin’s questions on the ground of relevance, and Chairman 
Biden agreed that the questions were out of order, because they were irrelevant: they 
did not pertain to the incident about which Hill had testified.257 The questions were 
outside the subject matter of the hearing, which, as described by Biden at the outset, 
was “to hear evidence on sexual harassment charges that have been made against 
Judge Clarence Thomas . . . .”258 
When Senator Hatch had his opportunity to question Thomas, he served not only 
as a decision maker, and a questioner, but also as a character witness for Thomas. 
Hatch said, “And those of us who know you, know that all of these [allegations by 
Hill] are inconsistent with the real Clarence Thomas.”259 Hatch also described a 
newspaper column that asserted that the charges against Thomas were the product of 
a smear campaign by vicious public interest groups.260 Hatch’s testimony illustrates 
the almost insurmountable challenge faced by legislators when they are called on to 
judge the admissibility of evidence that they will then consider in making a 
determination in which they obviously have an interest.  
The analogy to a trial is imperfect, but it does demonstrate the multiple, 
conflicting roles a legislator must play in a hearing. The legislator will ultimately be 
the judge of the matter, and the very existence of the hearing is an indication of some 
level of expectation that he will judge in an impartial and fair manner. If he could 
simply vote the way he wished to vote, in complete disregard of the evidence, why 
even conduct a hearing? So, an expectation of some fairness is inherent in the use of 
hearings and the admission of evidence. Yet the legislator is not actually an impartial 
judge, because he acts as an advocate in the hearing—Senator Metzenbaum seeks to 
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discredit one of Judge Thomas’s witnesses because he does not want Thomas 
confirmed, and Senator Specter refers to Professor Hill as a perjurer because he does 
want Thomas confirmed. When such strident activists become judges of the facts, 
confidence in the outcome is understandably diminished.        
Senator Specter’s allegation of perjury came in later questioning of Professor 
Hill.  Specter stated his “legal judgment” that Professor Hill had committed “flat-out 
perjury.”261  He did not make the allegation to Professor Hill, so that she would have 
had an opportunity to respond. Instead, he leveled the charge during his questioning 
of Judge Thomas. In explaining his accusation of perjury, Specter quoted Hill’s 
testimony in a morning session of the hearing, when she denied that any Senate 
staffer had told her that her “charges themselves in writing would result in Judge 
Thomas withdrawing” his name from nomination.262  Specter attempted to contrast 
that answer with Hill’s testimony during the afternoon session, when she answered 
“yes” to the question whether a specific Senate staffer whom Specter named had told 
her “that Judge Thomas might not wish to continue to go forward with his 
nomination if [Hill] came forward.”263 Senator Specter’s legal opinion to the contrary 
notwithstanding, the question to which Hill answered “no,” was materially different 
from the one to which she answered “yes.” The statements differed as to the 
consequences predicted to result from her charges. In the morning she had no 
recollection of being told Thomas would withdraw, but in the afternoon she testified 
that she had been told he might.264 More importantly, the statements also differed as 
to the specific action on Hill’s part that was predicted to cause the result. She denied 
in the morning having any recollection of being told that such withdrawal would 
result from her charges being made in writing,265 but acknowledged in the afternoon 
having been told that withdrawal might result if she came forward.266 Specter’s 
reference to his “legal opinion” reflects the complex nature of a senator’s role in 
hearings. In one sense, his opinion was expert testimony from a witness whose 
qualifications, regardless of how significant they might be, had not been established 
on the record. In another regard, however, Specter’s role was analogous not to that of 
a witness, but to that of a judge. He would ultimately vote on the confirmation, so it 
was his responsibility and his prerogative to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. 
Finally, he acted as a party: an adversary attempting to influence the outcome of the 
hearings.   
Hearsay remained a prominent feature of the hearing, not just in the questioning 
by senators, but in the testimony as well. As his testimony continued, Thomas said a 
member of his staff had told him repeatedly, when Hill was working for him, that 
“she did not have [Thomas’s] best interests at heart.”267 That same general theme of 
dangerousness was touched upon by Senator Simpson, who said he had received 
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many letters from people who knew Hill saying, “[W]atch out for this woman.”268 
Not only were these letters hearsay269 from anonymous declarants, but they also 
touched on Hill’s character, not for trustworthiness, but for an ill-defined trait of 
being someone to “watch out for.”270    
Senator Leahy then made an announcement arguably out-of-place in a hearing 
devoted to determining what happened: that calls to his office were “split down the 
middle.”271 When Leahy is seen in his role as a judge, with the responsibility to base 
his decision on the facts, his reference to phone calls to his office is troubling. He is 
aware, of course, of such expressions of opinion by constituents, but if he plans to 
cast his vote based on the tally of telephone calls he receives, why bother receiving 
evidence?    
Biden himself addressed the relative merits of a congressional hearing and a 
court proceeding as vehicles for resolving disputes such as the charges against 
Thomas. He spoke of the difficulty of judging allegations of the type Hill had made. 
Referring to male nominees for other positions, who have been accused of physically 
abusing their wives, he said:  
Now, we have an option in that particular [spousal abuse] case to say, 
well, we will send it to the court first.  Before we decide whether to 
confirm this particular person, have the court decide that issue.  Believe 
me, I would like that.  I did not sign onto this job or run for it to be a 
judge.272   
Biden’s distaste for a judicial role is emblematic of the chief flaw in a system that 
uses partisan legislators as finders of fact: they are not neutral—being neutral is 
inconsistent with their responsibilities—and they are ill-at-ease with neutrality. They 
fight for their constituents, their parties, and their principles—and rightfully so, when 
they act as legislators making policy, but not so when they function as fact-finders. 
Biden then explained why the matter must remain with his committee, rather than a 
court, even though he (and supposedly his colleagues) were uncomfortable acting as 
judges. With reference to the Thomas confirmation hearings, apparently referring to 
the need to act expeditiously, Biden said, “We could say we are not going to resolve 
that, let’s put this nomination on hold and send it to the courts. Not a possibility. Not 
able to do that . . . .”273   
Then, as if to illustrate one reason he had no desire to be a judge—the fact that he 
and his Senate colleagues were ill-suited to make evidentiary rulings and findings of 
fact—Biden began testifying. He stated that every expert he knew on the topic had 
said (about the type of allegations Hill made against Thomas) that “[i]t doesn’t 
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happen in isolated instances. It is a pattern.”274 Biden not only introduced hearsay, he 
introduced hearsay expert testimony.275   
The witness who immediately followed Hill and Thomas presented a textbook 
example of prior consistent statement constituting non-hearsay.276 Until this point in 
the hearing, the major themes had been Hill’s accusation that Thomas sexually 
harassed her a number of years before the hearing, and the assertions of some 
senators that after Thomas was nominated to the high court, Hill had fabricated or 
embellished the charges at the behest of a member or members of the Senate staff to 
keep Thomas off the Court because of his judicial philosophy.277 As to this claim, a 
witness testified that around the time when the harassment allegedly occurred—and 
thus long before Thomas’s nomination to the Supreme Court—Hill had confided in 
her about the harassment.278  This witness was followed by three more witnesses who 
described conversations, long before Thomas’s nomination, in which Hill informed 
them of the sexual harassment about which she was now testifying before the 
Committee.279  As Biden made clear, the hearing room was not a courtroom, and the 
rules of evidence did not apply.  The testimony of these four witnesses, however, 
provides a precise illustration of the circumstances under which a witness’s prior 
consistent statement is admissible.  Hill testified in 1991 that Thomas had sexually 
harassed her in the early eighties.  She was then accused of fabricating the charges 
after she learned of280 Thomas’s nomination to the Supreme Court because she 
disagreed with his politics.  Once the charge of recent fabrication was made, her 
statements to these four witnesses about the harassment, statements made several 
years before the hearing, were admissible to rebut the claim. Because the rules of 
evidence did not apply, the testimony of these witnesses was not subject to a hearsay 
objection, and so the analysis described above was not necessary. The rule regarding 
prior consistent statements does demonstrate why the testimony of these four 
witnesses was more pertinent than, for example, Senator Simpson’s assertion that he 
had received many letters from many unnamed people who claimed to know Hill, 
advising Specter to watch out for this woman. The letters were not placed in the 
record, nor did Hill have the opportunity to review them or respond to them.    
During the questioning of another panel of witnesses, an exchange occurred 
which demonstrated how little regard the committee had for evidentiary principles 
and the extent to which the committee members, as was their prerogative, did not 
consider themselves bound by those principles. The hearing went so far afield from 
fact-finding that a senator began questioning another senator. While Biden was 
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questioning one member of this pro-Thomas panel of witnesses, Biden stated to one 
of the witnesses that he believed her.281 The next question was directed to Biden by 
Senator Thurmond:  “In fact, you would believe all of them, wouldn’t you?”282 Biden 
replied, “Yes.”283 
Senator Metzenbaum then put into the record a letter from sixty-six of Hill’s law 
school classmates, attesting to her decency and integrity.284   A witness appearing in 
favor of Thomas responded to Metzenbaum’s questions about the letter in this way: 
“Well, I am sure that we had at least [sixty-six] women that were ready to come 
before this committee to tell them that Judge Thomas is a man of great decency and 
integrity if we are going to play the numbers game.”285  Another of the witnesses 
who had spoken in Thomas’s favor said, “You will have six times [sixty-six] . . . .”286 
The issue of relevance arose, but was not addressed, when the hearing moved 
beyond the issue of Hill’s accusations; Ms. Barry, responding to a comment by 
Metzenbaum, accused him of using an old tactic employed for too long in the 
nation’s history, and told him she was sickened by the tactic. Then Ms. Barry, Mr. 
Alvarez, and Senator Kohl argued heatedly, cutting each other off, about whether the 
treatment of Thomas by the committee constituted a lynching. 
Disregard for reliability was vividly displayed in Senator Metzenbaum’s 
questioning of a witness who appeared on behalf of Thomas. When John Doggett 
offered testimony unfavorable to Hill, Metzenbaum saw the opportunity to ask 
Doggett about allegations that he, Doggett, had touched women inappropriately and 
made unwelcome sexual remarks to women, all in the workplace. The primary 
obstacle to Metzenbaum’s plan to explore this line of questioning was that the 
women who allegedly leveled these charges were not testifying287 before the 
Committee, providing a sworn statement, or even a letter.  Because he was not 
constrained by any standard evidentiary rules,288 Metzenbaum found a device by 
which he could raise these allegations. That device was the use of rank hearsay from 
telephone interviews conducted by members of the Senate staff, and a remarkable 
effort to characterize the hearsay as Doggett’s own statement. 
In preparation for the hearings, members of the Senate staff had interviewed by 
telephone the women who apparently made the accusations, and those interviews 
                                                                
281Hearings Thomas, supra note 225, at 373.  
282Id. 
283Id.   
284Id. at 418.   
285Id. at 419.   
286Id. The witness’s statement seems to employ the eloquent style and meter of the 
Biblical injunction to forgive, not seven times, but seventy times seven. Cf. Matthew 18: 21-
22.  
287The witnesses may have been unwilling to make the allegations before the committee, 
or the committee may have declined to hear the witnesses because of the risk that testimony of 
minimal relevance could waste the Committee’s limited time.   
288Although Chairman Biden had prohibited reading from the affidavits of witnesses who 
did not testify, that rule did not govern the materials Metzenbaum used, because it was not an 
affidavit.   
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were transcribed. Those staff members subsequently conducted a telephone 
interview with Doggett, in which the staff members recounted the allegations made 
by the women in the earlier telephone interviews and asked Doggett for a response. 
The telephone interview of Doggett was also transcribed. During his questioning of 
Doggett in the committee hearing, Metzenbaum read from that transcript of the staff 
members’ telephone interview of Doggett. Specifically, Metzenbaum read a staff 
member’s recitation, in the Doggett telephone interview, of allegations which 
members of the Senate staff had heard in their telephone conversation with the 
women.289  
These allegations that Metzenbaum made to the Senate Judiciary Committee 
during the confirmation hearing were triple hearsay: Metzenbaum said that the 
transcript of staff’s call to Doggett said that the staff members had said during the 
Doggett interview that Amy Graham and Joane Checci in their own interviews had 
said Doggett had engaged in inappropriate touching and unwelcome sexual 
comments in the workplace.290 After Metzenbaum finished reading the accusations, 
he said, “Mr. Doggett, you have an interesting series of questions and answers in this 
transcript. I wonder if you would care to tell us what are the facts with respect to 
these several ladies who have raised questions concerning your own conduct?”291 
Doggett denied the allegations. He also said that the women’s’ statements were 
unsworn. Metzenbaum then delivered the final acrobatic flourish of his inquiry. 
Referring to the transcript of the staff/Doggett telephone interview in which Senate 
staff members recited the women’s allegations, Metzenbaum said, “This isn’t her 
statement. I’m reading from your statement, Mr. Doggett.”292  Biden made a 
somewhat tardy ruling that questions about unsworn allegations by witnesses who 
would not appear before the Committee were out of order.293 
The next significant ruling appears to be in conflict with the ground rules Biden 
had announced at the beginning of the hearing. Although Biden had disclaimed that 
any courtroom rules of evidence applied to the hearing,294 the committee used just 
such rules in excluding evidence that Anita Hill had taken a polygraph test regarding 
her charges against Thomas and passed. In making that ruling, the Committee relied 
on its conclusion that polygraphs are inadmissible in court trials. Reliance on 
courtroom evidentiary rules to determine the admissibility of these polygraph rules 
was inappropriate for at least two reasons. First, the rule that polygraphs are 
inadmissible is by no means uniform. Testimony about polygraph test results can be 
admitted as substantive evidence of the test outcome under the proper circumstances 
in the Sixth,295 Eighth, 296  and Ninth297 U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal. Other circuits 
                                                                
289Hearings Thomas, supra note 225, at 562-64. 
290Id. at 563-64. 
291Id. at 564.   
292Id. (emphasis added).   
293Id. at 565.     
294Id. at 2.  
295United States v. Stephens, 148 F. App’x 385, 389 (6th Cir. 2005) (describing the Sixth 
Circuit’s standard for the admissibility of polygraph tests). 
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have admitted the evidence of polygraphs tests for limited purposes.298 Second, the 
committee, through its chair, had expressly disclaimed being bound by evidentiary 
rules and had in fact asserted that Senate rules required the committee to admit 
evidence that would not be admissible at a trial.299 
Even though the committee declined to consider the results of the polygraph Hill 
took and passed, unidentified experts whose double-hearsay statements were 
submitted through the affidavit of a former United States Attorney were allowed to 
impeach those results by alleging that Hill passed the polygraph because she was 
delusional. These allegations that Hill was suffering from delusions were made in the 
affidavit of former U.S. Attorney, Larry Thompson.300 Two evidentiary issues, in 
addition to the polygraph question, are presented by Thompson’s statement. The first 
is notable for its status as double hearsay, in that it consisted of statements made by 
Thompson and statements made by Thompson’s unidentified scientific sources. 
Thompson did not testify at the hearing, nor did his sources. Thompson’s affidavit, 
referring to the statements of his unidentified sources, was admitted at the hearing. 
The second issue arises from the first. Because the statement was hearsay, no one 
could ask Thompson to clarify his assertion, in order that the Committee could 
understand exactly the identity and expert qualifications, if any, of the person who 
was alleging that Hill was delusional. Thompson’s statement read: 
In the context of these proceedings I understand, based on information 
from reliable scientific sources, that if a person suffers from a delusional 
disorder he or she may pass a polygraph test. Therefore, a polygraph 
examination ‘in this context has absolutely no bearing on whether the 
events at issue are true or untrue.’  301 
What did Thompson, in reliance on his sources, have to say to the Committee? 
He was saying much more than that a delusional person could pass a polygraph 
while stating falsehoods. That statement had no bearing on the hearing unless there 
was reason to believe Hill was in fact delusional. Had Thompson’s scientific sources 
told him Hill was delusional? Were those sources psychiatrists? Had they examined 
or treated Hill? Or had Thompson (or his scientific sources) concluded that Hill was 
delusional because they had turned on the television and seen some lay witnesses 
express the lay opinion that Hill was fantasizing—an opinion which, if expressed by 
                                                          
296Galloway v. Brewer, 525 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir. 1975) (weighing probative value 
against prejudice).   
297United States v. McIntyre, 582 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that trial court 
has wide discretion in admitting or excluding polygraphs).   
298See, e.g., United States v. Ramos, 933 F.2d 968, 976 (11th Cir. 1991) (not admissible 
until witness’s credibility attacked) Lenea v. Lane, 882 F.2d 1171, 1174 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(admissible in prison disciplinary proceeding); Marcial v. Coronet Ins., 880 F.2d 954, 961 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (admissible to prove party’s good faith); United States v. Lynn, 856 F.2d 430, 433 
(1st Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Estrada-Lucas, 651 F.2d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(admissible for impeachment)).  
299Hearings Thomas, supra note 225, at 2. 
300See id. at 374.   
301Id. at 373.   
41Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008
360 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:319 
anyone, should have been expressed by an expert, in keeping with rudimentary 
evidentiary principles.302 
No qualified expert opined at any point that Hill was delusional. Yet Thompson’s 
statement, without identifying the field in which his sources were experts, asserted 
that Hill passed the polygraph because she was delusional. The affidavit contains this 
allegation, yet is vague enough that the source of the allegation that Hill may be 
delusional cannot be identified.   
Quoted below are statements from Thompson’s affidavit, interlineated with 
hypothetical questions that might have been used to clarify his statements, if he had 
appeared at the hearing, taken the oath, and testified.    
Thompson: In the context of these proceedings . . .  
Question: What context? Do you mean in the context of a hearing in 
which a witness who took a polygraph and passed is accused by lay 
witnesses of being delusional? Do you believe Hill is delusional? If so, do 
you form that expert opinion based on your own evaluation or someone 
else’s? Has any expert said she was delusional?   
Thompson: “I understand, based on information from reliable scientific 
sources, that if a person suffers from a delusional disorder, he or she may 
pass a polygraph test.” 303 
Questions: Why does that matter in this hearing? Is there someone in this 
hearing you believe is delusional? Who is it? Why do you believe that 
person is delusional? Are you an expert in that area?     
Thompson: “Therefore, a polygraph examination is this context has 
absolutely no bearing on whether the events at issue are true or untrue.”304 
Question: What is “this context”? It would be the context of a delusional 
person taking a polygraph, right? So, you cannot state the polygraph has 
no bearing unless you have concluded that Hill is delusional, correct? 
Have you reached that conclusion? On what basis?   
                                                                
302Id. at 83 (Specter quoting from law school dean’s statement to the effect Hill’s 
allegations were the product of fantasy); id. at 438 (Specter’s statement that he intends to 
discuss Dogett’s affidavit which develops the idea of Hill’s fantasies); id. at 385.  Mr. Fitch, a 
lay witness, testifies, 
I may be on shaky ground here. I have read a little bit in psychiatry, but there is 
something called transference. . . .  
. . . [Y]ou’re able to focus on someone who is either a therapist or someone who has 
been kind to you, and things get kind of muddled and they carry the burden of 
whatever someone else may or may not have done or . . . something that you think 
actually happened.  
Id.  
303Hearings Thomas, supra note 225, at 373 (quoting Mr. Thompson’s affidavit). The 
questions throughout this section are inserted by the author. 
304Id. at 373 (quoting Mr. Thompson’s affidavit). 
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Because Thompson was allowed to put his opinion before the senators by 
affidavit, he was not asked these or similar questions. Allegations that Hill was 
suffering from delusions, made by lay people with no psychiatric training, were 
bootstrapped into an affidavit creating the implication that, “in the context” of her 
delusions, the fact that she had passed the polygraph had no tendency at all to prove 
that she was telling the truth. 
Characterized as it was by hearsay, unidentified expert witnesses, anonymous 
hearsay declarants, a senator as a character witness, one senator interrogating 
another, the committee chairman’s reference to the views reflected in telephone calls 
to his office, and letters from unidentified witnesses as character evidence, the 
Thomas hearings may be the modern-day nadir of Senate concern with reliability. 
The low emphasis on trustworthiness can perhaps be attributed to the highly-charged 
political nature of the hearing. The Senate was so closely divided on the question of 
Thomas’s nomination that Vice-President Dan Quayle, serving in the administration 
of the President who nominated Thomas, appeared in the Senate chamber at the time 
the vote was to be taken, prepared to break a tie if necessary.305 The vote to confirm 
Thomas was fifty-two to forty-eight.306 At those points during the hearings when 
senators abandoned trustworthiness, they may have acted on a variation of the truism 
“any port in a storm:” any evidence in a struggle for control of the Supreme Court.         
E.  Oversight and Investigation by a House Subcommittee:   
Responding to Hurricane Katrina 
Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the southern coast of the United States on 
August 29, 2005.307 By the time she had run her course, Katrina had proven to be one 
of the most devastating storms in the history of the nation.308 The hurricane had 
caused injury, death, and economic loss, all on a massive scale.309 In the storm, its 
aftermath, and the public furor over the response to the disaster, the government’s 
actions in predicting the storm and reacting to it were sharply condemned.310 Michael 
Brown, Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”), was the 
subject of a firestorm of criticism, which ultimately led to his resignation.311 To carry 
out its responsibility with regard to a matter of such great public concern and anger, 
the House of Representatives appointed the Select Bipartisan Committee to 
                                                                
305Examiner News Service, Words by Foe Aided Thomas, The Thomas Confirmation, 
Biden’s Call for “Benefit of Doubt” Cited by Senators; Oath of Office May Be Taken Monday, 
SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Oct. 16, 1991, at A1.     
306Id.  
307RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT, HURRICANE KATRINA 3 
(National Hurricane Center Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-
AL122005_Katrina.pdf.   
308Id. at 1.    
309Id. 
310A Failure of Initiative: Final Rep. of the Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, H.R. REP. NO. 109-377, at 1-6 (2006).  
311Trenton Daniel, Hurricane Katrina: Meek Applauds Changes at FEMA, MIAMI 
HERALD, Sept. 13, 2005, at B4. 
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Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. Congressman 
Tom Davis, a Republican from Virginia, chaired the Select Committee. Davis 
opened the hearings by offering his interpretation of the Select Committee’s 
mandate: “to stop attacking or defending government entities for partisan purposes, 
and do the oversight we’re charged with doing.”312 As a member of the party in 
power at the time of the prediction of and reaction to the storm, Davis seems to be 
saying that he does not want the committee to be too zealous in its search for the 
facts.  He appears to be steering the committee away from any exacting scrutiny of 
the administration’s actions with regard to the hurricane.       
One of the witnesses allowed to submit testimony to the committee was James 
Bernhard, the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of The Shaw 
Group, Inc. (“Shaw”). Shaw, a Louisiana corporation, had entered into a contract 
with FEMA to provide services in areas devastated by the storm.313 Shaw was 
awarded the contract without any process of competitive bidding.314 One justification 
for such a contract is that in the wake of a disaster, there is no time for bidding. Still, 
the no-bid contract, along with Shaw’s political contributions to the party controlling 
the executive branch during the storm and the response to it came under the scrutiny 
of media and government watchdogs.315 Yet Bernhard’s written testimony before the 
select committee consisted only of a patently self-serving written statement. No 
committee member posed any questions to Bernhard regarding the no-bid contract, 
the campaign contributions, or the quality of Shaw’s work. Because no questions 
were asked, the only effect of this testimony was to bolster the assertions that the 
politically-connected contractor had performed well. No significant relationship 
between the testimony and the committee’s task of oversight and investigation is 
apparent. This select committee, like Congress and all of its committees, exercised 
the power Senator Harkin had guarded so jealously with his objection during the 
Clinton impeachment trial: the power of Congress, its two constituent bodies, and the 
committees of those two bodies, to determine which questions they will ask, which 
witnesses they will hear, and which documents they will review.316 If the House 
Subcommittee in fact called Bernhard in order to allow Shaw to defend its work—
and thereby defend the administration’s decision to award Shaw a no-bid contract, 
the decision to call Bernhard for that purpose was within the power and prerogative 
of the committee. Such a decision, however, to the extent it is politically motivated, 
should call into question the neutrality of any findings made on the basis of that 
testimony.   
                                                                
312U.S. Representative Thomas M. Davis III (R-VA) Holds a Hearing on Hurricane 
Prediction, Part 1, FDCH Cap. Transcripts 2005 WLNR 15024382 (September 22, 2005). 
313Laura Jesse, No-bid Contracts to be Reopened, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 17, 
2005, at 5A.   
314Id.    
315Id. 
316See supra notes 208-212 and accompanying text. 
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III.  THE PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION PROHIBITION ACT OF 2003:  CONGRESS MAKES 
FINDINGS BEFORE HEARING EVIDENCE; THE COURT EMPLOYS THOSE FINDINGS, 
THOUGH ACKNOWLEDGING THEY ARE INCORRECT  
A.  Erroneous Legislative Findings Underlying the Partial-Birth Abortion 
Prohibition Act of 2003   
The fact-finding process leading up to Congress’s passage of the “Partial Birth 
Abortion Prohibition Act of 2003”317 (“PBAPA 2003”) was so inadequate that some 
findings, including the keystone finding that the banned procedure was never 
medically necessary to protect the health of the pregnant woman, were simply 
wrong.  Even in upholding the ban, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged 
these errors made by Congress in reaching the conclusions on which the law was 
based.  Describing the findings as “factually incorrect,”318 the Supreme Court 
explained why they were erroneous by citing to those pages of the trial court opinion 
in which their inaccuracy is detailed,319 the explanation of the errors in Congress’s 
finding of  “a ‘moral, medical, and ethical consensus’ that . . . [the procedure] ‘is 
never medically necessary.’”320  The trial court explains the flaws in the 
congressional process which resulted in this finding—a finding that the trial court, 
the appellate court, and the Supreme Court all conclude to be incorrect. Congress 
claimed that there was such “a medical consensus that the . . . procedure [wa]s never 
medically necessary”321 when in fact nine medical associations, including the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, as well as individual 
physicians, had testified before Congress in opposition to the ban because of their 
medical opinion that it was, for some women under some circumstances, safer than 
other procedures.322 
Among the unspecified number of congressional findings which the Supreme 
Court determines to be incorrect, it names only two, concluding that “[t]wo examples 
suffice.”323 One of those two findings is that a medical consensus exists that the 
banned procedure is never medically necessary to protect health. The other example 
the Supreme Court gives of an incorrect finding is Congress’s determination that no 
medical schools teach the procedure that is the subject of the ban.324 The Court refers 
to two scenarios that may account for the erroneous congressional findings: the 
findings may have been inaccurate at the time they were made, and, regardless of 
                                                                
31718 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (2008).     
318Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1637-38 (2007).  
319Id. at 1638. 
320Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(1), 117 stat. 120 (3003) 
reversed by but cited for some propositions in Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 1610).    
321Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1638. 
322Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 330 F. Supp at 481-82.   
323Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1638. 
324Id.  
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whether correct when made, they may have been superseded,325 presumably by 
changes in circumstances between the legislative hearings and the litigation. 
Although the Court leaves each of those possibilities open as to each of the two 
erroneous findings, the record establishes that Congress’s erroneous conclusion that 
there is a medical consensus that the procedure is never medically necessary to 
protect health was incorrect at the time Congress made it. That section of the trial 
court’s decision to which the Supreme Court cites for the proposition that the 
congressional finding was incorrect326 describes, for example, the evidence before 
Congress that individual physicians and nine medical associations opposed the ban, 
including the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.327 With 
Congress aware, at the time of its finding, of such a significant body of medical 
opinion that the procedure was sometimes necessary to protect health, any court 
would be hard-pressed to conclude the finding was correct.    
B.  Judicial Review of Congressional Findings, Erroneous and Otherwise 
The limits of the Supreme Court’s prerogative to rely on the erroneous 
Congressional findings underlying PBAPA 2003—and the level of scrutiny with 
which the Court is to review any given legislative enactment—depend on the 
jurisprudence of judicial deference to congressional findings. That body of law exists 
because the Court, over time, has calibrated its level of respect for Congress’s 
findings to account for the legal theory under which the challenge to the statute is 
brought, the asserted rights or interests of the parties making the challenge, and the 
legal status of those parties.   
Any exploration of legislative findings and judicial review begins at the 
“Continental Divide” of judicial deference: the border separating those legislative 
acts that the Court reviews to determine whether they have any rational basis, and 
those in which the Court strictly scrutinizes the legislature’s action. Rational basis is 
a forgiving analysis, while strict scrutiny is not, so the standard of review is crucial 
to the outcome of the challenge. Statutes enacted pursuant to Congress’s power to 
regulate interstate commerce, along with statutes creating classifications that are not 
suspect, are upheld if there is any rational basis for the legislature’s action. In sharp 
contrast, statutes that impinge on individual liberties or involve a suspect 
classification, are strictly scrutinized.         
The theory behind the level of deference applicable in rational basis cases is that 
the legislature possesses a superior ability, as compared to the court, “to ‘amass and 
evaluate . . . vast amounts of [information]’” necessary to decide complex fact 
questions subject to change over time.328 Following from that comparison of 
institutional competency are a number of ever more deferential rules, in which the 
Court seems to outdo itself time and again in deferring to Congress. For example, 
deference is appropriate not only when Congress has in fact “‘amass[ed] and 
                                                                
325Id.  
326Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330 F.Supp.2d 436, 481-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), 
reversed by but cited for some propositions in Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 1610.    
327Id.  
328Cal. Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282, 1299 (E.D. 
Cal. 1998) (striking down state statute regulating political contributions).   
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evaluate[d] . . . vast amounts of data . . . .’”;329 it may also be appropriate even when 
empirical information is incomplete or wholly unavailable. The rationale for this rule 
is that, whether there is data or not, the legislative branch is better equipped than the 
judicial branch to make the determination.                 
The zenith of court deference, and thus of legislative power, is represented by the 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in a dispute 
involving a government benefit available to blind Medicaid recipients, but not to 
other Medicaid recipients.330 The benefit provided to blind Medicaid recipients 
consisted in the State of Indiana’s treatment of income from another government 
assistance program known as the Plan for Achieving Self-Support (“PASS).”331 
Indiana considered the PASS payments to some recipients in determining their 
income for purposes of Medicaid eligibility, but did not consider the PASS income 
of blind recipients in determining their eligibility for Medicaid benefits.332 As lead 
plaintiffs in a class action, two recipients of PASS benefits, who were severely 
disabled but not blind, challenged on multiple grounds Indiana’s decision to provide 
a particular benefit to blind recipients, but not to others.333 
Although the class raised multiple attacks to the statute based on a number of 
theories, the challenge which is significant to the relationship between legislative 
trustworthiness and judicial deference is the equal protection challenge, evaluated 
pursuant to a rational basis standard because the non-blind PASS recipients were not 
members of a protected class.334  Even in the absence of any findings supporting the 
distinction between the two types of aid recipients, the court concluded that the 
statute creating the benefit, and limiting it to blind recipients, did not offend the 
Constitution. Although the legislature did not point to any evidence or empirical data 
to support the finding on which it relied to provide more benefits to blind Medicaid 
recipients, the court stated that no such evidence or data was needed, because the 
Indiana legislature’s decision was valid even if it was based on nothing more than 
“rational speculation.”335  The court’s deference was so great that it was even willing 
to serve as a proxy for the Indiana legislature and conduct the “rational speculation 
unsupported by evidence or empirical data” which the legislature had neglected to 
do, or of which it had at best neglected to make a record.336  The speculation which 
                                                                
329Id. 
330Vaughn v. Sullivan, 83 F. 3d 907 (7th Cir. 1996).  
331Id. at 909 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382a(b)(4)(B)(iv), 1382b(a)(4) (2000)).  
332Id. at 910.   
333Id.   
334See Wisconsin v. City of  New York, 517 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (stating that strict scrutiny 
is not applicable to alleged failure to count persons in census, absent showing of intentional 
discrimination by government); Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 
489 (1977) (finding that furloughed employee denied unemployment compensation pursuant 
to state statute denying such benefits to worker employed as result of labor dispute not a 
member of protected class and, thus, statute is not reviewed under strict scrutiny standard).       
335Vaughn, 83 F.3d at 913 (quoting F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 
(1993)).  
336Id. (quoting F.C.C., 508 U.S. at 315). 
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the court provided was this: “one potential difference between the blind and the 
members of the plaintiff class… [was] that blind participants in PASS programs are 
more likely to become self-sufficient.”337  The court then applied the forgiving 
rational basis standard to the speculation the court believed the legislature could have 
conducted, and declared that speculation to be rational. Even legislative findings 
which are wrong come within the broad sweep of the Vaughn court’s deference:  
“Wrong or not, . . . such a belief [that blind Medicaid recipients were more likely 
than other recipients to become self-sufficient if provided the statute’s benefit] could 
not be called irrational.”338     
Just when it might appear that the limits of deference could not expand any 
further, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, one year after the 
Vaughn339 decision, ruled not only that a statute subject to rational basis analysis 
must be upheld when the finding of the legislature could have been based on rational 
speculation, but also that a statute subject to such analysis must be upheld unless the 
facts on which the court speculates the legislature relied “could not reasonably be 
conceived as true by the governmental decisionmaker [sic].”340 As was the case in 
Vaughn, there was no requirement that the legislature make a finding, because the 
court speculated as to the facts on which the legislature may have relied. Just as the 
Seventh Circuit was willing to uphold a finding even if it was wrong, Third Circuit 
seemed to go even further, expressing its willingness to uphold a statute unless it is 
impossible to conceive of the findings on which the statute may be based as true.     
This deference of monumental proportions, when applicable, extends not just to 
the finding itself, but to the process by which that finding is made. One example of 
that deference to process is the holding that Congress is not obligated to make a 
record of the type an administrative agency or a court would be required to make.     
When rational basis is not the test, legislatures tend to fair poorly. One rung 
below rational basis on the deference ladder is the intermediate scrutiny applicable to 
First Amendment cases involving restrictions that are neutral as to content. In such 
disputes, the statute is upheld if “Congress has drawn reasonable inferences [that are] 
based on substantial evidence.”341 A leading example of this intermediate level of 
scrutiny is a First Amendment challenge to a statute requiring cable companies to 
carry local broadcast television channels. This proper standard to apply to such a 
content-neutral regulation is whether it: (1) advances government interests which are 
important and unrelated to suppression of speech; and (2) does not burden a 
substantially greater quantum of speech than necessary to further those interests. 
Even employing intermediate scrutiny, the Court conducted so vigilant a review that 
it examined, in some detail, the very documents relied on by Congress in making its 
determinations. The legislative record included a study conducted by the Federal 
                                                                
337Id.  
338Id.  
33983 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 1993).   
340Sammon v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 66 F.3d 639, 647 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vance V. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)).   
341Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C. 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994) (reviewing statute requiring 
cable companies to carry local channels) (citing Century Commc’n Corp. v. F.C.C., 835 F.2d 
292, 304 (D.C. Cir 1987)).   
48https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss2/5
2008] DOES CONGRESS FIND FACTS OR CONSTRUCT THEM? 367 
Communications System regarding the extent to which cable companies dropped or 
refused to carry local channels.  The Court evaluated this study and found it not only 
unhelpful, but also insufficient to support Congress’s findings that must-carry 
legislation was needed.  The Court reached this conclusion because the study 
specified neither what time period it covered, nor whether the dropping of stations 
was permanent.  Even if all those questions could have been answered to the Court’s 
satisfaction, the statute would not have survived in the absence of a congressional 
finding, based on evidence, that local broadcasters would be hurt financially or 
otherwise disadvantaged in the absence of such a statute. Moreover, there was no 
information in the record about the effect of the statute on cable programmers. 
Related to this flaw is the absence of any findings by the trial court regarding the 
availability and efficacy of constitutionally acceptable, less restrictive means to 
achieve government’s purposes. 
The rules established so far are that deference is greatest in rational basis cases 
and less in intermediate scrutiny cases. The lowest quantum of judicial deference is 
applied in challenges to the legislature’s impingement on fundamental rights or 
reliance on suspect classifications. The restrictions applicable to Congress’s 
incursion on a constitutional right apply regardless of whether that right is explicit or 
implicit;342 the same standard is applied to those statutes in which different groups, 
defined by use of suspect classifications, are treated differently.343 Examples of 
statutes and other government actions subject to strict scrutiny because they impinge 
on fundamental rights include: a state statute prohibiting publication of the names of 
juvenile offenders, which violates the free speech guarantees of the First 
Amendment;344 and a state statute completely prohibiting even truthful advertising 
regarding liquor prices, which violates the First Amendment.345 
Strict scrutiny applies to equal protection challenges only when the challenged 
statute metes out different treatment based on a suspect classification. Not all 
classifications are suspect. For example, an attorney’s right not to divulge accurate 
information about his services did not require the Court to strictly scrutinize the 
state’s requirement for disclosures by attorneys who advertise their services.346 
Prison regulations affecting prisoners’ rights to marry and correspond are not 
evaluated pursuant to a strict scrutiny standard, because a more deferential standard 
is appropriate in the context of prison rules.347 Classifications that are suspect include 
race,348 sex,349 national origin,350 and status as an alien.351 Among classifications that 
                                                                
342Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980).  
343Id. at 322-24.  
344Smith v. Daily Mail Pub., 443 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1979).  
34544 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 534 (1996).   
346Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).   
347Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).   
348Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), cited in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 
322 (1980).   
349Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973).   
350Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540,  548 (1983) 
(listing national origin among suspect classifications); U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 
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are not suspect, and which therefore do not implicate the equal protection clause, are 
the desire to participate in assisted suicide,352 status as out-of-state attorneys 
aggrieved by local court rules,353 status as children of undocumented immigrants,354 
and age.355 
The hierarchy which the Court has established, in decreasing order of deference, 
consists of rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. As the 
Court gives, so the Court can take away, and the Court has taken away some 
deference previously enjoyed by the legislature in Commerce Clause cases. 
Paradoxically, the Court seems to have given Congress some leeway in those matters 
traditionally governed by the most exacting level of deference—strict scrutiny.     
Traditionally, courts have afforded the most forgiving review and the greatest 
deference356 to Congress’s findings that an activity it seeks to regulate has an effect 
on interstate commerce. Even in Commerce Clause cases, however, deference is not 
unlimited.  A trend toward limiting Congress’s power to legislate pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause—and specifically to limit deference to Congress’s finding that an 
activity it sought to regulate affected interstate commerce—began in the waning 
years of the twentieth century. Deference was reined in considerably when the Court 
considered a challenge to the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act, which prohibited 
possession of guns within a certain distance of a school and rendered such possession 
a federal offense.357  In considering the attack mounted by a person convicted 
pursuant to the statute, the United States Supreme Court noted that Congress had not 
made any finding as to the effect that guns in school zones had on interstate 
commerce.358 Acknowledging that there is no requirement for Congress to make such 
a finding, the Court nevertheless stated that a finding, to whatever extent it would be 
helpful, was absent and that “no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye . 
. . .”
359
  Congress’s “accumulated institutional expertise” about guns, gained through 
passing previous laws, could not be imported to form the basis for the finding of an 
effect on interstate commerce necessary to uphold this statute, because the 
                                                          
166, 174 (1980); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647 (1948) (striking down statute, on 
grounds of equal protection, where statute discriminated based on nationality).  
351Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1971) (invalidating statutes imposing 
waiting period for aliens to be eligible for government assistance).   
352Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (finding that state statutes prohibiting assisted 
suicide do not touch on fundamental rights or involve a suspect class). 
353Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 644 (1987) (stating out-of-state attorney subject to local 
court rule not a member of a suspect class).   
354Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-25 (1982) (stating children of undocumented 
immigrants are not a suspect class). 
355Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (stating age is not a suspect 
classification) (citing multiple cases).    
356See Plyer, 457 U.S. at 223.    
357United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).   
358Id. at 562.   
359Id. at 563. 
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challenged statute prohibits a different act from those acts which Congress had 
previously criminalized based on data regarding guns.360   
Throughout the litigation in the Lopez case, up to and including review by the 
United States Supreme Court, the government attempted to fill in the blanks left by 
Congress, asking the courts to supply rational speculation sufficient to uphold the 
enactment, just as the Seventh Circuit had done in Vaughn.361 The government 
offered several arguments in an effort to persuade the courts that the statute came 
within the sweep of Congress’s power to legislate pursuant to the Commerce Clause, 
and each of those arguments was rejected by the Court. For example, the government 
argued that violent crime affects the cost of insurance for everyone throughout the 
nation and causes individuals to be reluctant to visit the areas in which such crime 
occurs. The Court rejected these two arguments, noting that if so tenuous a 
relationship could justify the legislation, then Congress could regulate every violent 
crime.362 The government also argued that violence near schools hurts the 
educational process, ultimately making for less productive citizens and a negative 
effect on the economy.363 The Court rejected this argument as well, based on similar 
reasoning.364     
A similarly narrow view of deference resulted in the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision that sections of the Violence Against Women Act were 
unconstitutional as beyond Congress’s authority to legislate under the Commerce 
Clause. The Court held that whether the effect on interstate commerce is enough to 
bring an action within Congress’s power to regulate pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause is for the court to decide. 
Deference jurisprudence, then, includes the tripartite standard of review, and the 
Supreme Court’s trend toward rejecting Commerce Clause findings. Although these 
threads of the law of deference can be difficult to weave into a whole garment, 
certain basic principles can be discerned. One such principle is that Congress’s reach 
is far shorter, and judicial review correspondingly less deferential, when 
constitutional rights are at stake. The value at work in such cases is that the 
deference courts afford to legislative findings cannot preclude a court’s independent 
review of the facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law. Absent such a rule, the 
legislature could, by means of fact-finding, protect a statute violative of human rights 
from the only review that could remedy that violation.   
This traditionally jealous eye with which the Court has protected individual rights 
would seem to indicate that the recent tightening of deference in Commerce Clause 
cases would be accompanied by a corresponding tightening of that same standard in 
the already less deferential individual rights cases. Analysis of this Commerce 
Clause development leads to this conclusion: when the Court’s deference to 
Commerce Clause findings diminishes as it did beginning in the 1990s, its deference 
to legislative findings in individual rights cases necessarily moves to an even lower 
level than such findings in individual rights cases had previously enjoyed, because 
                                                                
360Id. at 563.   
36183 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 1996).   
362Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.    
363Id.    
364Id.  
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deference in individual rights cases was at the lowest rung on the deference ladder, 
even before the tightening of Commerce Clause deference.   
This analysis was tested when the Court, after reining in deference in rational 
basis cases, faced the task of applying the much lower standard of deference in a 
case involving individual rights in the context of one of the most contentious public 
policy debates in the nation’s history: abortion. 
C.  The Court Incorporates Congress’s Erroneous Findings into Its Analysis in 
Gonzales v. Carhart 
In 2000, in Stenberg v. Carhart365 (“Carhart I”), the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that a Nebraska statute banning a certain type of late-term abortion violated the 
Constitution because it did not include an exception allowing the procedure when 
necessary to protect the health of the woman.366 Only seven years later, in Gonzales 
v. Carhart367 (“Carhart II”), the Court concluded that such a ban in a federal statute 
did not violate the Constitution, even though it included no exception allowing the 
procedure when necessary to protect the health of the pregnant woman.368 In 
explaining why a health exception was required in 2000 but not in 2007, the Court 
referred to changes which Congress made in response to Carhart I.  “The [2003] Act 
responded to Stenberg [Carhart I] in two ways.  First, Congress made factual 
findings. . . . Congress found, among other things, that ‘[a] moral, medical, and 
ethical consensus exists that the practice of performing a partial-birth abortion . . . is 
a gruesome and inhumane procedure that is never medically necessary . . . .”’369 
Paradoxically, while the Court appeared to refer to Congress’s “never medically 
necessary” finding to explain what had changed between the dramatically different 
rulings in Carhart I and Carhart II,   the Court also concluded that that same finding 
was incorrect and stated that it did not “place dispositive weight on Congress’s 
findings.”370   
The “never medically necessary” finding made by Congress,371 and the 
importance of that finding to the decision in Carhart II, give special significance to 
the degree of evidentiary rigor, or lack of it, which Congress employed in making 
that finding. Any evaluation of the trustworthiness of this finding begins with the 
Supreme Court’s determination that the finding is incorrect—that Congress got the 
proverbial cart before the horse, or, in this case, the finding before the proof.  Instead 
of being based on the evidence that would ultimately be received by Congress, the 
                                                                
365Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
366Id. at 937-38; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-326(9), 28-328(1) (2007).  
367Gonzales v. Carhart, 127  S. Ct. 1610 (2007).  
368Id. at 1635-37; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (2008).     
369Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1624 (quoting Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003, P.L. No. 108-
105, § 2, 117 Stat. 1201 (referring to the Congressional Findings in the historical and statutory 
notes following 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (2007))).  Congress’s second response to Carhart I, 
described by the Court as “more relevant” to the Court’s decision in Carhart II, was to 
describe the prohibited procedure with more specificity.  Id.   
370Id. at 1637 (emphasis added).   
371
 Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003, P.L. No. 108-105, § 2(1), 117 Stat. 1201. 
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“never medically necessary” finding, and essentially all the congressional findings 
enumerated in the statute, were made at the beginning of the 2003 legislative 
process, before the first witness testified or the first exhibit was examined. Any 
evidence that may have been before Congress when it passed abortion bans in 1995 
and 1997 could not be considered in fact-finding conducted with regard to the 2003 
act, for three reasons. First, medicine changes at such a pace that evidence which is 
at least six years old (carried forward from 1997 to 2003) cannot be assumed to be 
current. Second, the makeup of Congress is not stagnant. Most, if not all, of the 
senators and representatives who heard the evidence supporting the 1997 ban would 
have stood for re-election before the consideration of the 2003 ban. Third, the pre-
2003 evidence was received in consideration of bans that were significantly different 
from the 2003 law—and the United States Supreme Court has made clear that 
evidence received while considering the prohibition of one act cannot be carried over 
and used in consideration of a statute prohibiting a different act.   
When the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee 
convened on March 25, 2003, Chairman Steve Chabot opened the hearings with a 
statement that corresponds, almost verbatim, with the congressional finding that 
Congress included in the law and on which the Supreme Court relied. Before his 
subcommittee had received any evidence, Chabot had already decided what he 
believed—and those beliefs would later be memorialized as the findings of 
Congress.  Chabot said, “[a] moral, medical and ethical consensus exists that partial 
birth abortion is an inhumane procedure that is never medically necessary and should 
be prohibited.”372  He spoke not from evidence, because no evidence had been 
received, but from the decision he had already made, before the hearing began.        
Following Chabot’s statement, he and the other members of the committee had 
the opportunity to be present while evidence373 was presented on both sides of the 
question of the procedure’s medical necessity. The committee first received the 
statement of Mark G. Neerhof, a professor of obstetrics and gynecology. Dr. Neerhof 
testified that the procedure involved serious risks to the woman and that none of 
those risks are necessary because other procedures are available.374 He also testified 
that the type of abortion under discussion was “never the only procedure 
available[,]”375 but he did not testify that it was never the safest procedure 
available.376 The documents received by the Committee included the statement of 
board-certified Maternal-Fetal Medicine Specialist Curtis Cook, that in ten years of 
practicing maternal-fetal medicine he had never encountered a clinical situation in 
                                                                
372Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 760 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 
760], available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house_ 
hearings&docid=f:85987.pdf. 
373Although law professors and lawyers also testified before the subcommittee, those 
experts were called to assist the subcommittee in understanding the law, and so their 
statements had no bearing on the findings regarding a consensus opposition to the procedure 
and the finding that the procedure was never medically necessary.  
374Hearing on H.R. 760, supra note 372, at 6-7.  
375Id. at 7. 
376Id. at 6-10. 
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which the procedure at issue was required or even considered a clinically superior 
option.377 Dr. Cook further described the procedure as “gruesome” and 
“inhumane.”378 Physician Camilla Hersh submitted a letter to the committee in which 
she stated that the procedure was never medically necessary to protect a woman’s 
health.379 The record of the hearing also includes a 1996 letter from an 
obstetrician/gynecologist. The physician stated that he had never seen a situation in 
which the procedure was necessary.380 The record includes letters from other 
physicians to the effect that the procedure (or the procedure about which the 
physician is writing) is never medically necessary to protect a woman’s health.381     
There was also substantial evidence offered in opposition to the ban. The record 
reflects opposition to the ban by the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists and eight other medical societies.382 In addition, the record includes 
letters and statements from physicians to the effect that doctors should have the 
option of using the procedure because it is sometimes necessary to protect a 
woman’s health.383   
Other details of the hearing raise additional concerns about Congress’s fidelity to 
accuracy and trustworthiness. The letters in the record, particularly the older letters 
dating back as much as a decade, raise hearsay concerns. In addition, Congressman 
Chabot put hearsay into the record in the guise of a question. Chabot asked Neerhof 
a question which consisted largely of quotations from the statements of a registered 
nurse, Brenda Pratt-Shaffer, particularly her graphic description of a late-term 
abortion procedure she had witnessed. She did not testify before the subcommittee 
considering the 2003 ban, nor was she available to be questioned at that hearing. But 
her statements are in the legislative record of that hearing because a congressman 
read them into the record in a lengthy narrative preceding a question to a different 
witness.  The United States Supreme Court, in upholding the ban, quoted this 
hearsay statement.   
A second significant evidentiary concern regarding the 2003 hearings, besides 
hearsay, is the qualification of expert witnesses who testified or submitted written 
statements, as well as the reliability of their methods. Of the many expert witnesses, 
none was required to establish, to the extent necessary in a courtroom voir dire, that 
he was qualified to offer testimony on the pertinent topic or that the methods by 
which he reached his conclusions were reliable methods appropriate to his 
specialty.384   
                                                                
377Id. at 88. 
378Id. at 89. 
379Id. at 115-16.   
380Id. at 117.   
381Id. at 118-19, 130.   
382Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1644 (2007).   
383Hearing on H.R. 760, supra note 372, at 186-95.  
384See FED R. EVID. 701 (setting forth the scope of opinion testimony by lay witnesses); 
see also FED R. EVID. 702 (setting forth the qualifications necessary to testify as an expert 
witness and the grounds for admissibility of an expert’s conclusions).     
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The fact-finding supporting the PBAPA 2003 is flawed in other respects. The 
minority party, which generally opposed the bill, was allowed only one witness at the 
hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary 
Committee.  Forced to choose between a constitutional law expert and a medical 
expert, the minority opted to call the former, leaving the record devoid of any live 
medical testimony before the committee in support of the position that the procedure 
was sometimes necessary.  Congress and its committees, as Senator Harkin stated so 
pointedly during the Clinton impeachment trial, choose the evidence they hear.385 
More to the point, the majority in Congress chooses the evidence that will be heard. 
For that reason, there exists a risk that Congress, if it is predisposed to reach a 
particular outcome, can choose to accept witnesses and documents that support that 
outcome, 386 rather than examining all pertinent evidence in order to make findings 
based on the facts. 
Further evidence that Congress favored politics over reliability came from 
outside the government.  After the Supreme Court decided Carhart II, confirmation 
that Congress’s “never medically necessary” finding was wrong came from an 
unexpected quarter: Focus on the Family (“Focus”), one of the most conservative, 
and most politically active, Christian organizations in the country, with a radio 
audience of seven million, led by James Dobson.387 Focus’s acknowledgement that 
the banned procedure has safety advantages is best understood in the context of a 
chronological review of two statements issued by Focus regarding the safety of the 
procedure.   
Before the ban was enacted, in its lobbying for passage of the statute, Focus 
issued and posted on its website a statement, reassuring those who might be 
concerned that the proposed ban supported by Focus could pose a detriment to the 
health of some women. The Senior Policy Analyst for Focus, adopting the statements 
of certain physicians, set forth Focus’s position regarding the need for a health 
exception: ‘“[t]here is no obstetrical situation that requires the willful destruction of 
a partially delivered baby to protect the life, health or future of a woman.”’388 Focus 
used this adamant statement denying the need for a health exception as it rallied its 
                                                                
385145 CONG. REC. S59, 279 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999).  
386Legislators do not have a corner on political fact-finding.  Courts are as capable as 
legislatures of creating the very facts that will lead to the conclusion they favor. There are, 
however, limits on judges’ political fact-finding, which do not apply in the legislative branch. 
Fact-finding in courts, at least of judicial facts, is typically conducted by jurors, making it 
impossible for judges to generate an outcome by manipulating the facts. In constitutional 
challenges, however, the fact findings will usually be made by the court. Another check on 
political fact-finding by judges is the appellate court. Finally, the court’s obligation to generate 
a written explanation of its findings means that the court will not have unbridled discretion 
with regard to facts. The court can serve its political interests only in so far as it can explain 
them in some manner that does not strain credulity, and thus respect for the court, to the 
breaking point.   
387Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bork Hearings Resurface as Impediment to Specter, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 11, 2004 at A26 (referring to Focus on the Family’s seven million listeners).    
388Carrie Gordon Earll, Frequently Asked Questions:  Partial-Birth Abortion, (Jan. 4, 
2005), http://www.citizenlink.org/FOSI/bioethics/abortion/A000001313.cfm (quoting Nancy 
Romer et al., Letter to the Editor, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1996). 
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members to contact their legislators to ensure that no such exception would appear in 
the statute. 
Yet, after the ban was passed and upheld by the Court, Focus was in 
circumstances where it would benefit from making a statement that was the polar 
opposite of what it said before the ban. Yielding to the exigency of the moment, 
Focus issued a post-ban statement diametrically opposed to its pre-ban statement. 
The ironic result was that Focus, with its second statement, confirmed that 
Congress’s “never medically necessary” finding was wrong. After the decision in 
Carhart II, when the ban, without a health exception, was firmly in place, bearing 
the imprimatur of the United States Supreme Court, Focus was subjected to friendly 
fire: severe criticism from a number of other anti-choice/pro-life organizations that 
condemned Focus for supporting and celebrating a ban which these less 
incrementalist groups saw as worse than useless in the fight to outlaw abortion 
altogether. 389  Responding to this criticism, Focus defended its support of the ban, 
insisting that the new law would decrease the number of abortions performed. 
Focus’s Vice-President Tom Minnery argued Focus’s position to the media: he 
explained that non-intact dilation and extraction, in which the fetus is dismembered 
in the uterus, remained legal. He further stated that this still-legal procedure in which 
the fetus is not extracted intact is not favored by physicians, because it “‘involves 
using forceps to pull the baby apart in utero . . . [and therefore] means there is 
greater legal liability and danger of internal bleeding from a perforated uterus. So 
we firmly believe there will be fewer later-term abortions as a result of this 
ruling.’”390 Focus’s about-face regarding the risk to women’s health posed by the ban 
reflects the lack of trustworthiness, and perhaps the cynicism, which characterized 
Congress’s fact-finding in relation to the ban. The individuals and organizations 
concerned about the issue naturally adopted the tactics of the Congress they hoped to 
influence: using evidence not to reach an accurate conclusion, but to support the 
outcome they wanted.   
Congress’s reliance on findings characterized by significant flaws would be 
troubling in any event, but any trust placed in those findings is especially disturbing 
because Carhart II involved strict scrutiny, the least deferential standard of review, 
applicable because individual rights were at stake. 
IV.  CARHART II:  A RULING IN SEARCH OF A RATIONALE?  
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Carhart II is a reversal of its 
holding only seven years earlier in Carhart I. The conflicting rulings, within a few 
years of each other, necessitate particular attention to the rationale for the second 
decision. One route to understanding Carhart II is analysis of the Court’s opinion in 
that case. Another path is a more realistic, even cynical, recognition that the statute 
and the Court’s opinion upholding it are products of the political battle from which 
they arose. 
                                                                
389Alan Cooperman, Supreme Court Ruling Brings Split in Anti-abortion Movement, 
WASH. POST, June 4, 2007, at A03. 
390Id. (emphasis added).   
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A.  Searching for Answers in the Text of the Court’s Opinion 
The Court’s opinion in Carhart II presents multiple, inconsistent answers to four  
questions that are crucial to its ruling.     
The first question to which the Court gives conflicting answers is this: did the 
Supreme Court rely on Congress’s erroneous finding that there exists a medical 
consensus that the prohibited procedure is never necessary to protect the health of a 
pregnant woman?  Because Carhart II and Carhart I reach opposite answers to 
essentially the same question, it is undeniable that something changed in the time 
elapsing between the two rulings. The opinion in Carhart II identifies one change on 
which the Court appears to place significance: between the two decisions, Congress 
made a fact-finding “that ‘[a] moral, medical and ethical consensus exists that the 
practice of performing a partial birth abortion . . . is never medically necessary . . . 
.’”
391
  It appears, from the passage of the Carhart II decision emphasizing this 
finding, that the Court is inexplicably relying on the congressional fact-finding it has 
labeled erroneous.  Several paragraphs later, the Court seems to distance itself from 
this erroneous finding, yet without jettisoning it altogether, perhaps because the 
Court needs the finding:  “[W]e do not in the circumstances here place dispositive 
weight on Congress’ findings.”392 It appears that the Court may be willing to place 
some weight on the erroneous finding it earlier cited as a change occurring between 
Carhart I and Carhart II, but not dispositive weight. Elsewhere in the opinion, the 
Court labels the finding “factually incorrect.”393 Although the finding is incorrect, the 
Court keeps open its option to defer to that finding, asserting not that deference to 
such an erroneous finding—even in an individual liberties case—is entirely 
inappropriate, but only that uncritical deference to incorrect factual findings is 
inappropriate—leaving on the table the possibility of deferring from a critical 
perspective.394 Nothing in the opinion resolves the question whether the Court relied 
on the erroneous finding. The most that can be gleaned from the opinion is that 
Congress’s erroneous finding should not be given uncritical deference or dispositive 
weight, but that perhaps it can be given deference meted out critically, along with 
some, though not dispositive, weight, all because the fact-finding was one concrete 
change between Carhart I and Carhart II. What the Court never reveals is whether it 
in fact placed some weight on and gave critical deference to this finding.   
One additional nuance of the opinion in Carhart II is that the Court uses 
Congress’s erroneous finding, sub silentio, to create the medical uncertainty that is 
the fulcrum of the Court’s decision. The facts on which the Court bases its ruling 
must come from somewhere.  Those facts cannot have come from the lower court 
rulings, because if the Supreme Court had relied on the findings of the lower court, it 
would have struck down the ban. The facts relied on by the Court cannot be 
legislative facts of its own making, because legislative findings, i.e., policy findings, 
                                                                
391Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1624 (2007) (quoting PBAPA 2003, P.L. No. 
108-105, § 2, 117 Stat. 1201 (referring to the Congressional Findings in the historical and 
statutory notes following 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (2008))). 
392Id. at 1637.   
393Id. at 1638 (citing Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 482, 488-91 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004)). 
394Id.   
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by the Court would constitute a new rule of law, abolishing constitutional protections 
the Court had reaffirmed just seven years earlier. Problematically for the Court, the 
only other source for the facts on which to base its ruling is the “never medically 
necessary” finding of Congress, which, as the Court acknowledges, is wrong. The 
actions of Congress and the lower courts leave the Supreme Court with few options. 
The Court does not want to affirm the lower courts, because the Court wants to 
uphold the ban. The Court does not want to embrace Congress’s finding, even 
though it would lead to the result the Court wants, because that finding is plainly 
wrong. So, the Court unapologetically melds the finding of the lower courts with the 
diametrically-opposed finding of Congress to create a third finding: no one knows 
whether the procedure is ever medically necessary. By ruling as if one of the two 
bodies to whom it could choose to defer had made this no-one-knows finding, the 
Court is able to proceed as if it were simply applying existing law to this new 
finding. This approach makes it possible for the Court to avoid expressly overruling 
a constitutional right reaffirmed seven years earlier.        
The second important question to which the Carhart II Court’s answer is elusive 
is this: what standard of review does the Court employ: rational basis, with its 
correspondingly high level of deference; or the stricter standard applicable to statutes 
impinging on individual rights, under which the Court must conduct an independent 
review of the factual findings on which the statute is based? The Court states early in 
the opinion that it must, because constitutional rights are involved, conduct an 
“independent determination of all questions . . . of fact and law . . . .”395 But did the 
Court review this statute restricting access to abortion as an impingement on 
fundamental liberties, or as an exercise of Congress’s power to legislate pursuant to 
the Commerce Clause? Later in the opinion, the Court appears to change the 
standard and conduct a rational-basis review, concluding that Congress must be 
allowed to legislate in the face of medical uncertainty because the ban, which 
regulates the medical profession, was enacted pursuant to Congress’s Commerce 
Clause powers and should be upheld, unless the enactment cannot rationally have 
been based on those findings.396 
The third question not clearly answered in Carhart II is this: what degree of 
uniformity in medical opinion must exist in order to reanimate the constitutional 
requirement of a health exception from the state of dormancy into which it was 
placed by the decision in Carhart II? The decision in Carhart II appears to arise 
from the Court’s unwillingness to require a health exception when there is conflict as 
to whether such an exception would ever be needed. Conversely, the opinion seems 
to indicate that as long as some segment of the medical profession believes the 
procedure is not needed to protect any woman’s health, Congress can criminalize the 
procedure. The Court has eliminated the “zero tolerance policy”397 prohibiting 
Congress from legislating in the context of uncertainty and imposed instead a zero 
tolerance policy prohibiting a woman from having the procedure in the context of 
medical uncertainty, regardless of her need for the procedure, because some 
unquantified segment of the medical profession believes she does not need it. 
                                                                
395Id. at 1637 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60 (1932)).   
396Id. at 1638.   
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The fourth question answered inconsistently by the Court is whether the decision 
precludes any woman from challenging the ban on the basis that she, specifically and 
individually, needs the procedure to protect her health. The Court goes to some 
lengths to insist that it is rejecting only the facial challenge to the statute and that an 
“as applied” challenge is still available. The Court’s first description of its decision 
portrays it as a ruling which upholds the ban against “the broad, facial attack brought 
against it.”398 The Court repeats the reference to the facial challenge as it begins to 
describe the reasons for its ruling399 and again when it phrases the question as 
whether the ban can stand when medical uncertainty persists.400 The Court then 
invites an as-applied challenge, concluding that such a challenge is “the proper 
manner to protect the health of the woman if it can be shown that in discrete and 
well-defined instances a particular condition has or is likely to occur in which the 
procedure prohibited by the Act must be used.”401  Ultimately, the Court makes the 
point in a direct, almost pointed, manner: “The Act is open to a proper as-applied 
challenge in a discrete case.”402 
Yet, the Court painstakingly avoided an outright rejection of the “never 
medically necessary” finding. In fact, the Court relied on Congress’s findings, 
because it had to base its decision on some findings made somewhere, and only 
Congress’s findings would allow the Court to uphold the ban. The facts on which the 
Court based its decision had to come from one of three places. First, the Court could 
have adopted the findings of the lower courts, but then the ban would have been 
struck down, so that option was not chosen. Second, the Court could adopt the 
finding of Congress, but that finding was flatly wrong, making it almost impossible 
to accept wholeheartedly. The Court did not rely on the trial court finding, yet the 
Court could not rely, expressly and clearly, on a finding that was wrong. So the only 
remaining option apparently open to the Court was to reverse its seven-year-old 
reaffirmation of the individual rights at issue. With no attractive option available, the 
Court created a third fact-finding option: melding the lower court’s finding that the 
procedure was sometimes medically necessary with Congress’s finding that it was 
never medically necessary. By melding the findings of Congress and the lower court, 
the Court generated some compromise finding that no one had ever made. The Court 
accepted Congress’s “never medically necessary” and mixed it with the lower courts’ 
findings so that the Court could uphold the ban without acknowledging that it was 
overruling Carhart I. The Court’s reliance on Congress’s finding, to form half of the 
hybrid finding the Court would affirm, is puzzling in light of the erroneous nature of 
the finding.   
B.  Searching for Answers in the Subtext 
The significance of President Bush’s appointment of Roberts and Alito is 
described from the position of a proponent of the ban, in the comments of Richard 
                                                                
398Id. at 1619.   
399Id. at 1629. 
400Id. at 1636. 
401Id. at 1638.   
402Id. at 1639 (comparing Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410, 411-12 (2006) 
(per curiam)). 
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Land, President of the Southern Baptist Foundation for Ethics and Liberty regarding 
the decision in Carhart II:  “‘This decision is a powerful and timely reminder of the 
enormous significance of presidential elections and their pivotal impact on the 
makeup of the Supreme Court . . . .’”403 
It may be that only the naïve, in seeking to understand the United States Supreme 
Court’s about-face in the seven years between Carhart I and Carhart II, would focus 
exclusively on the opinion and ignore the change in the composition of the Court. 
Between those two decisions, Chief Justice William Rehnquist died, and President 
George W. Bush appointed Chief Justice John Roberts to fill the vacancy resulting 
from Chief Justice Rehnquist’s death.404  The other change in the Court’s personnel 
between the two decisions resulted from Justice Sandra Day O’Conner’s retirement, 
followed by President Bush’s appointment of Justice Samuel Alito to fill that 
vacancy.405 The practical effect of these changes on the decision in Carhart II is that 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s vote, with the minority of four, to uphold the ban in 
Carhart I,406 was replaced with Chief Justice Roberts’s vote, with the majority of 
five, to uphold the ban in Carhart II,407 while Justice O’Conner’s vote, with the 
majority of five, to strike down the ban in Carhart I,408 was replaced with Justice 
Alito’s vote with the majority of five to uphold the ban in Carhart II.409 The realist 
and the cynic may conclude that these were the only changes of any significance that 
occurred in the years that elapsed between Carhart I and Carhart II, and that these 
changes in the personnel of the Court resulted in the diametrically opposed outcomes 
in the two cases.   The realist-cynic, abandoning the search for answers in the text of 
the opinion in favor of answers in the subtext, may see an especially political 
influence at work in the appointment of Supreme Court justices, resulting in partisan 
decision-making in Carhart II. A few days after President Bush was elected to a 
second term, psychologist and religious broadcasting mogul James Dobson, whose 
radio program, Focus on the Family, commands an audience of seven million,410 
appeared on the ABC television program “This Week” with host George 
Stephanopoulos.411 When Stephanopoulos commented on Bush’s failure to refer to 
                                                                
403Adelle M. Banks, Activists See Abortion Ruling as Call to Arms, NAT’L CATHOLIC REP. 
(Kan. City), Apr. 27, 2007, at 8 (quoting Robert Land, the President of the Southern Baptist 
Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission).   
404Alec Russell, Bush’s Favourite is Sworn in to Key Court Role, DAILY TELEGRAPH 
(London), Sep. 30, 2005, at 16.     
405Jesse J. Holland, With Roberts a Shoo-In, Bush Eyes Next Nominee, INTELLIGENCER 
(Wash. D.C.), Sept. 27, 2005, at 10A; Charles Babington, Alito is Sworn in on High Court: 
Senators Confirm Conservative Judge Largely on Party Lines, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2006, at 
A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/14/AR200 
7081401015.html.    
406Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 980 (2000). 
407Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1619.   
408Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 947. 
409Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1618.   
410See supra note 389.  
411This Week (ABC television broadcast Nov. 7, 2004).   
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abortion in televised comments setting forth his mandate for the second term, 
Dobson was sanguine, assuring Stephanopoulos and the television audience that 
Bush has “been pretty consistent on [such] policies, sometimes behind the scenes.”412     
Stephanopoulos then inquired about a telephone call Dobson had received from a 
member of Bush’s White House staff shortly after the election, thanking Dobson for 
his own support and that of Dobson’s audience. Dobson responded to the expression 
of gratitude by issuing a warning, through the staff member, to Bush and the 
Republican party.413 When Stephanopoulos inquired about the content of the 
warning, Dobson replied that the “people of faith . . . [who] put George Bush in 
power again have some very strong views.”414 Dobson then came to the heart of the 
warning delivered to Bush and his fellow Republicans through the White House staff 
member: that the President and his party had two years, four at the most, to 
implement the policies of morality favored by the people of faith who handed Bush a 
second term, or “they’ll pay a price at the -in [sic] the next election.”415  
When Stephanopoulos asked Dobson for the specifics of what he and his listeners 
were pressing Bush to do, Dobson gave a reply foreshadowing not only the 
appointment of two conservative justices to the United States Supreme Court, but 
also the very issue that would come before that remade Court:  “[the President] has 
strongly stated that he is – he is pro-life, that he wants to protect life, not only unborn 
life but the culture of life . . . . And especially, especially putting conservative judges 
on the judiciary. That is the key to everything.”416 Dobson’s warning to the President 
and his party regarding the consequences of failing to carry through on pro-life 
policy, which preceded Bush’s appointment of Roberts and Alito, may reveal more 
regarding the reason for the decision in Carhart II than does the Court’s opinion.   
V.  CONGRESS SHOULD EMPLOY NEUTRAL FACT-FINDERS OR ADOPT AT LEAST 
RUDIMENTARY EVIDENCE STANDARDS   
A.  Evidentiary Rigor as Institutional Competency 
Given that the basis for judicial deference to legislative findings relates to the 
special competence Congress is thought to possess in collecting and evaluating vast 
quantities of evidence on which to base its findings, that deference is unwarranted if 
Congress conducts hearings in which it fails to apply even minimal standards of 
relevance and reliability to the evidence it considers, preferring politically useful 
evidence over reliable evidence. Any argument that legislators should be expected to 
act in a partisan way because they are politicians, ignores this central fact regarding 
congressional hearings: their purpose is the ascertainment of accurate information on 
which to base a policy decision. The assumption that Congress will be neutral in its 
fact-finding, which finds one expression in the rules regarding judicial deference, 
                                                                
412Id. (statement of Dr. Dobson).  Dobson did not go so far as to state explicitly that Bush 
had acted behind the scenes to convey to Dobson assurances about his plans for pursuing an 
agenda opposed to choice.  Id. 
413Id.  
414Id.  
415Id.  
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implicitly includes the assumption that Congress will endeavor to obtain and use the 
most reliable evidence possible, in order to make the most accurate finding possible. 
Making evidentiary rules applicable to congressional hearings would enhance 
Congress’s ability to maintain and use such trustworthy evidence. The decision to 
adopt such standards can be made only by Congress, and any rules adopted must be 
tailored so as not to embroil Congress in evidentiary disputes or hinder the policy-
making work of Congress. The suggestion that Congress’s proceedings should be 
governed by, for example, the Federal Rules of Evidence, would be senseless. By 
contrast, implementation of the idea that Congress’s hearings should be governed by 
minimal standards of trustworthiness is likely to improve fact-finding and thus 
enhance the confidence that the American people and the courts place in those 
findings.     
The beginning point of the argument that Congress should adopt basic 
evidentiary standards is that there are types of evidence that Congress could consider 
in making a fact-finding that would be an inappropriate basis for a decision. If, for 
example, a witness in an impeachment trial wishes to testify that the official should 
be removed from office because he is an adherent of a religion different from the 
witness’s, neither the Senate nor an impeachment trial committee should base a 
decision on that testimony or include it in the body of evidence to be considered in 
deciding the matter. Similarly, if a business executive testifies that regulations 
proposed for his industry might occupy his thoughts to such an extent as to hurt his 
golf game, that testimony should not be considered in reaching the legislative 
decision. A consumer protection advocate might appear at a hearing on proposed 
automobile safety legislation and present to the committee a letter typed on lined 
notebook paper and riddled with spelling and grammatical errors. The letter is in 
support of the legislation and purports to be from the chief executive officers of the 
three largest automobile companies doing business in the United States, but the three 
signatures appear to be in the same handwriting. The committee conducting the 
hearing on the consumer protection legislation should not include the letter in the 
body of evidence it considers in making its decisions. 
Given that it is possible for Congress or its committees to be presented with 
evidence so lacking in trustworthiness that it should not be considered, and given 
that Congress has no rules regarding such evidence, the question arises: if proof is 
completely untrustworthy, as were, for example, the double hearsay claim that a 
witness in the Thomas hearing had committed sexual harassment, and the 
allegation—traceable to no expert—that Anita Hill was somehow delusional, should 
it be left to Congress to disregard it? The difficulty with that solution is evident from 
the review of impeachment hearings and other high-profile hearings, described in 
more detail above and summarized here, during which Congress repeatedly 
demonstrated its failings in judging the quality of evidence. For example, during the 
Clinton impeachment trial, the Senate admitted 14,201 pages of documents without 
any discussion of relevance, hearsay, or any other core evidentiary issues.417 During 
one of the depositions taken before two or three senators, the witness’s attorney 
objected because the question posed had already been asked and answered in a 
transcript included in the documents admitted earlier. The presiding senator 
responded, “[I]f this is going to be the case, we don’t even need the deposition, 
                                                                
417See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.   
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because we’re limited to the record and everything is in the record. So I think, uh, to 
be fair, we’re—we’re obviously going to have to talk about, uh, some things for 
[eight] hours here, or else we can go home.”418 
Congress also demonstrated its tendency to allow unreliable evidence in the 
Senate trial of Walter Nixon. In preparation for that trial, Senator Howell Heflin 
addressed the question of admitting the entire transcript of Nixon’s criminal trial. 
Although Nixon’s counsel objected to the transcript as hearsay, Heflin advised the 
committee that the transcript was admissible as an adoptive admission by silence, 
i.e., each statement in the trial was admissible because Nixon did not deny each 
statement individually, even though he had pleaded not guilty and was present with 
his attorneys to defend against the charges.419   
Further indications of Congress’s need for evidentiary rules can be found in the 
record of the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearing. During that proceeding, Arlen 
Specter quoted a witness who claimed he had seen Anita Hill at a professional 
meeting, and she said that Thomas’s nomination was great.420 Specter then asked Hill 
about a statement made by her former dean, to the effect that he had heard Hill praise 
Thomas.421  Specter then asked Hill about two individuals who claimed Hill did 
know well a person whom Hill had denied knowing well.422 Later in the hearing, 
Heflin asked Thomas about the allegation, made on local television the previous 
evening, that a television reporter had said Thomas was slow to react to allegations 
of sexual harassment in his own agency.423 
Senator Metzenbaum made particularly troubling use of hearsay when he 
questioned a pro-Thomas witness about allegations of sexual harassment made 
against the witness, even though the witness’s accusers neither testified nor made 
written statements.424 Metzenbaum even referred to the allegations as having come 
from the witness’s own statement, because members of the Senate staff had quoted 
the accusers’ allegations in their telephone interview of the pro-Thomas witness.425 
B.  Models of Non-Partisan Fact-Finding 
The choice whether to separate fact-finding from policy-making, or to continue 
conflating the two, rests exclusively with Congress. That decision, however, is a 
legitimate consideration for the public in determining the confidence it places in 
lawmakers, and—in the case of legislative hearings—it is a legitimate, perhaps an 
                                                                
418S. DOC. 106-4, at 1690 (1999), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
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William Jefferson Clinton). 
419See supra notes 183, 185 and accompanying text.   
420See supra note 236 and accompanying text.   
421See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.   
422See supra note 243-46 and accompanying text. 
423See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.   
424Hearings Thomas, supra note 225, at 562-64. 
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essential, consideration for a court determining whether to defer to a legislative 
finding.   
If Congress426 decides to separate policy-making from fact-finding, leaving the 
former in its current partisan status but converting the latter to a neutral process, 
there is more than one framework for implementing that decision. Congress could 
empower a separate body or agency to conduct fact-finding and report to Congress. 
One such entity, which would consist of experts in the particular topic in question, 
would bear at least some resemblance to the Royal Commissions of Inquiry 
employed in Great Britain.427 These Royal Commissions were in use prior to the 
Revolutionary War, and, in fact, King George III of England established such a 
Royal Commission to hear complaints from loyalists living in the colonies as 
rebellion against the British throne fomented.428   
Instead of a commission, Congress may choose to create a position similar to that 
of the special masters429 employed by courts, usually to make or recommend findings 
requiring particular expertise. The selection process for the master would be non-
partisan, because any other approach would reintroduce the partisanship that the use 
of the special master should eliminate.   
While such a commission of experts would likely examine questions regarding a 
single topic or incident, another, more permanent body that could accomplish non-
partisan fact-finding and report to Congress is the Congressional Research Service.430 
The highest ranking officers of the Congressional Research Service are appointed by 
the leadership of Congress. That system allows for the possibility that the Service 
would conduct its fact-finding in a partisan manner, because of loyalty to those who 
appointed them. Even with the current system of appointment by the party in control 
of Congress, the Service is regarded as non-partisan.431 Careful design of the method 
for selecting the top officers of that Service could render the body more thoroughly 
non-partisan, and the same process would suffice for a commission of experts 
assigned to conduct fact-finding.     
                                                                
426If evidentiary rules are adopted, they should be adopted by the Congress as a whole, 
because having one house operate under such rules while the other does not is likely to prove 
unmanageable. Such a hybrid approach would likely preclude joint committees and joint 
hearings. 
427BHP Billiton Is Accused in “Saddam Kickbacks” Scandal, EVENING STANDARD, p. 26 
(January 31, 2006) (accusation of kickbacks to Saddam Hussein by Australian Wheat Board).    
428Robins Island Pres. Fund v. Southold Dev. Corp., 959 F.2d 409, 423 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(referring to a claim against the State of New York related to land that the State had acquired 
by means of the Attainder Act of 1779).   
429FED. R. CIV. P. 73 (allowing appointment of special master for evidence requiring 
particular attention to voluminous evidence, or requiring particular knowledge in a certain 
field of expertise, if the parties stipulate to have such an issued tried by a special master).   
430Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 676 (1998) (citing the 
Congressional Research Services Campaign Debates in Presidential General Elections).   
431See, e.g., Sabrina Eaton, Vote Cutoff Creates Furor in House, PLAIN DEALER 
(Cleveland), Aug. 4, 2007, at A9 (referring to “nonpartisan Congressional Research Service” 
and its report on eligibility of  undocumented  immigrants for government assistance).  
64https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss2/5
2008] DOES CONGRESS FIND FACTS OR CONSTRUCT THEM? 383 
If the selection of the neutral fact-finding body is not done carefully, then the 
work of that purportedly neutral body can, like the political fact-finding it is intended 
to replace, become partisan. Because politically motivated selection of the members 
of the entity would defeat the goal of non-partisan fact-finding, the structure of the 
selection process is crucial. One viable option is for a fact-finding body, whether ad 
hoc or permanent, to be appointed by five officials: the highest-ranking members of 
the majority party and the minority party in the Senate, their counterparts in the 
House, and the Librarian of Congress (appointed by the President432 but still at some 
distance from partisan considerations due to the lack of a term limit for the position). 
The Librarian of Congress, who is entrusted with the vast body of information 
maintained for the use of the legislative body, appears to be particularly qualified to 
participate in the selection of a Congressional Commission on a given topic of 
concern.   
Neither an ad hoc commission nor a non-partisan agency of Congress is likely to 
have the skill to investigate issues such as Anita Hill’s allegations against Clarence 
Thomas. In such cases, the independent body conducting fact-finding for Congress 
may find it necessary to employ skilled litigators to resolve such difficult questions, 
using rules similar to those applicable in a courtroom.   
A third option, in addition to the commission of experts and the Congressional 
Research Service, is for Congress to retain its fact-finding function, but to render that 
process less partisan by adopting basic evidentiary rules to promote reliance on 
trustworthy evidence. The challenge Congress would face in implementing this 
recommendation is to draft standards that enhance reliability without entangling 
Congress, its two fact-finding bodies, and their committees in battles about the 
interpretation of the rules. To meet this test, the rules must cover only those matters 
that are essential to reliability; they must be clear and concise; they must leave little 
room for interpretation; and they must identify the person or persons who will apply 
the rules.   
The evidentiary rules most essential to trustworthiness involve the authenticity of 
documents, hearsay, the reliability of expert witnesses, and the impeachment of 
witnesses. The authenticity of documents to be used in any hearing can be 
considered in advance by a neutral documents examiner acting as a part of one of the 
fact-finding bodies described above. If this recommendation is implemented, a 
hearing could begin with all questions about the authenticity of documents resolved. 
One approach to the hearsay problem is for Congress to adopt a rule prohibiting 
the introduction of all statements made outside the hearing, with exceptions for: any 
previous statements of a witness who is testifying at the instant hearing; books, 
journals, magazines and newspapers bearing the date and name of the publication; 
and letters or written statements from individuals or associations interested in the 
matter under consideration. To avoid the need for interpretation of this rule, there 
should be no residual exception. Any lack in the exceptions, or in any of the rules, 
could be cured by Congress through the same process used to adopt the rules. Such 
amendments should not occur during a hearing, because of the likelihood of a rule 
resulting that is designed to guide the hearing to a particular outcome, and the 
likelihood of wasting time in the debate of the change in rules.   
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To ensure the proper qualifications of expert witnesses and the reliability of their 
methods, those qualifications and methods should be reviewed in advance of the 
hearing to the satisfaction of a commission of experts in the appropriate field, 
established in the manner described above.  
Any witness should be subject to impeachment regarding bias, motive, 
perception, memory, or sincerity. Impeachment by proof of convictions or bad acts, 
however, should be limited to proof that the witness has been convicted of perjury, 
without a subsequent judgment or certificate of innocence. Nominees and 
government officials subject to oversight hearings should be subject to questioning 
about any conviction, bad act, misfeasance, nonfeasance, or other matter with which 
a legislator wishes to impeach them, although the prohibition against hearsay and 
other rules recommended here should still apply.     
If the rules are in fact clear and concise, the role of the interpreter(s) will be 
appropriately minimal, because partisanship could otherwise creep into the process 
through the rulings of the interpreter(s). The choice as to who should interpret the 
rules would be as important as it would be difficult. One option is for the majority 
leader and minority leader in each house of Congress to choose, at the beginning of 
each Congress, a person to make any evidentiary rulings necessary to the 
proceedings of that house and its committees. The person could be an academic or 
practitioner with particular expertise in evidence, or a leader in a respected 
organization such as the American Bar Association. This officer, appointed without 
term limits and serving during good behavior, would be called upon only when a 
legislator asserts that there has been a violation of the basic evidentiary rules adopted 
by Congress. The ruling of the officer could not be appealed, even to Congress, 
because any other rule would sacrifice the non-partisan fact-finding these 
recommendations are intended to promote.     
If Congress chose to adopt rules similar to these, it could do so in a way as to 
maintain maximum flexibility while vigorously promoting reliability. For example, 
Congress could utilize a neutrally-appointed body for some issues and conduct its 
own fact-finding in other cases, utilizing basic evidentiary rules. Congress could 
pose specific questions to the neutral body, which would, if Congress so specified, 
be limited to answering those questions, with explanation if Congress so specified. 
Congress could instead ask one of the neutral bodies for general guidance, depending 
on the matter being investigated. Moreover, Congress could implement these 
suggestions in some instances while engaging in old-fashioned partisan fact-finding 
on other occasions, mindful that a court might pay careful attention to the method of 
fact-finding when deciding what deference is appropriate. Most important, any 
legislator could base her or his vote on anything, including evidence not presented, 
or even on a whim, and could refer to any evidence or information whatsoever in 
casting the vote, or in any context other than the fact-finding hearing. The official 
findings of the body, however, could not be based on these remarks outside the 
hearing process and would instead depend exclusively on the evidence actually 
considered during the fact-finding process.     
Judicial review of congressional fact-finding arises only in the context of 
legislative hearings, and therefore courts can consider the legislature’s evidentiary 
rigor in determining deference only in the context of a challenged statute. In making 
that decision, the absence of any evidentiary standards governing congressional 
hearings—or the failure to abide by those rules—should weigh heavily against 
deference. In other types of hearings, the extent to which Congress adopts rules to 
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ensure the trustworthiness of the evidence on which it bases its findings will be 
determined by the interest of Congress, and the public, in reliable findings.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
It is fundamental to the United States system of tripartite government that each 
branch of that government be independent. It is equally fundamental to the 
independence of the legislative branch that each member of Congress—elected, after 
all, to represent her constituents—have the power to influence the nation’s policies 
by debate, argument, and vote, as she, in her discretion, deems appropriate. In such a 
body, partisanship is no evil; it is necessary to carry out the business of the 
representative body. While partisanship should influence policy decisions, it should, 
to the extent possible, be eliminated from the process of fact-finding. The proper 
functioning of the legislature does not depend on the power currently possessed by 
senators and representatives to treat fact-finding as a partisan tool, which can be 
shaped and manipulated to justify a particular outcome in a policy decision. The 
danger to democracy lies not in a requirement that Congress evaluate evidence 
pursuant to standards sufficient to ensure its trustworthiness, but in the temptation of 
a brawling, maneuvering politician to wrap himself in the homespun cloak of the 
earnest pilgrim seeking truth.              
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